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Counseling, Consulting, and Consent: Abortion
and the Doctor-Patient Relationship
Mary Anne Wood* and W. Cole Durham, Jr. **
The landmark holdings of the United States Supreme Court
liberalizing access to abortion have placed special emphasis on
the doctor's role in helping a woman decide whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy. Roe v. Wade1envisioned the abortion
decision as being made by the woman in consultation with her
attending physician.* Doe v. Bolton3 held that the interests in
female autonomy and fetal life were adequately safeguarded by
the woman's initial consultation with her physician, and that
statutory provisions requiring independent medical review were
uncon~titutional.~
Most recently, in Colautti v. Franklin,"he
Court again emphasized "the central role of the physician, both
in consulting with the woman about whether or not to have an
abortion, and in determining how any abortion was to be carried
out. ""
The emphasis on the doctor-patient relationship in these and
other abortion cases7 is no accident. The Supreme Court, like
courts and legislatures in many other parts of the world during
the 1970's, has been grappling with the problem of striking a more
sensitive balance between female automony and fetal life than
that achieved by restrictive nineteenth century abortion legislation.# By leaving the abortion decision to the expectant mother
and her physician, the Court reasoned that it could eliminate
restraints on abortion not rationally related to the mother's
health or to legitimate state interests while interposing the re* Assistant Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. B.A., 1966, Brigham Young University; J.D., 1976, National Law Center, George
Washington University.
** Assistant Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. A.B., 1972, Harvard University; J.D., 1975, Harvard Law School.
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Id. a t 153.
3. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
4. Id. a t 195-200.
5. 47 U.S.L.W. 4094 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1979).
6. Id. a t 4096.
7. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 64, 71 (1976); Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9 (1975); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 195-98 (1973).
8. See C. TIETZE
& M. MURSTEIN,
INDUCED ABORTION:1975 F A ~ O O7 K
(Population
Council Reports on PopulatiodFamily Planning No. 14, 2d ed. 1975).
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strained and balanced judgment of the medical profession in the
decisionmaking process. Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton9 underscores the significance of the medical profession's role in this regard. He emphatically rejected the contention that the Court in Roe and Doe had
legitimated abortion on demand, noting that such a view overlooks the reality that "the vast majority of physicians observe the
standards of their profession, and act only on the basis of carefully deliberated medical judgments relating to life and health."1°
The Court's conclusion that physicians are able to piay a
mediating role in preventing the woman's expanded autonomy
from taking an undue toll in fetal life is based on a stereotyped
picture of the doctor-patient relationship. The Court envisions
the woman and her doctor counseling together to carefully consider the variety of factors relevant to her abortion decision-including possible medical complications, psychological
harm, and potential impact on her life, family, and future.ll After
such consultation, the doctor exercises his best medical judgment
about whether the abortion should be performed, and the woman
presumably defers. This concept of the doctor-patient relationship recurs as a premise in subsequent Supreme Court decisions
on abortion.I2
Unfortunately, the vision conjured up by the Supreme Court
is not the reality in today's abortion practice. At least six out of
ten abortions performed in the United States are performed in
freestanding abortion clinics.13 Doctors in such clinics typically
have a direct financial interest in seeing that abortions are performed as rapidly and efficiently as possible.14 Frequently, the
only time the doctor sees the patient is when she is on the operating table awaiting the procedure?
-

-

9. 410 U.S. 113, 207-08 (1973) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
10. Id. at 207-08.
11. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
12. See, e.g., Colautti v. Franklin, 47 U.S.L.W. 4094, 4096-97 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1979);
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
13. Sullivan, Tietze, & Dryfoos, Legal Abortion in the United States 1975-1976, 9
FAM.PLAN.
PERSPECTIVES
116, 127 (1977). The percentage of abortions performed in clinics
may be even higher now, as the number of clinics is growing while the number of hospitals
performing abortions is declining. Id. at 126-27.
14. See, e.g., Auerback, Abortions: Now It's Big Business, in Hearing on S.J. Res.
119 and S.J. Res. I30 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 468 (1976); Connor, Liberal Abortion Law
Proves to Be a Bonanza for New York Doctors-Critics Hit "Profiteering," or Is It Free
Enterprise? Referral Agencies Scored, in id. at 470.
15. See Goldsmith, Early Abortion in a Family Planning Clinic, 6 FAM.PLAN.
PERSPEC~VE~
119 (1974); Klaus, A Medical Cop-out?, 133 AM. 68 (1975).
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Even assuming there is some sort of doctor-patient consultation, much can and has been said in criticism of the Supreme
Court's peculiar reliance on the doctor-patient relationship as an
approach to resolving the abortion controversy. In light of the
woman's freedom to select her own doctor, the protection this
solution provides for developing life may be de minimus as a
practical matter. Moreover, medical expertise does not carry with
it moral authority, and therefore the justification for making the
medical profession the ultimate arbiter of the abortion decision
is difficult to see.l%t least some women may mistake a doctor's
judgment for moral approbation and derive unwarranted moral
solace from a clinical opinion. In addition, allocation of a decisionmaking role to the doctor may reinforce a paternalistic
doctor-patient relationship. Yet, barring a constitutional amendment, the Court's approach is here to stay.
The Court's careful insistence on doctor involvement in the
abortion decisionmaking process can be taken in two ways. First,
it can simply be dismissed as so much legal claptrap cluttering
up a clear constitutional endorsement of unfettered female autonomy. This has been the dominant approach. If the significance of
the Court's insistence on doctor involvement in the abortion
choice is recognized a t all, the tendency has been to render lip
service to this aspect of the Court's decision, catalogue the failings of this approach, and then blithely assume that for all practical purposes, Roe u. Wade and its progeny repose the abortion
choice entirely in the hands of the woman, at least during the first
trimester. l7
The aim of this Article is to suggest the plausibility and
possible ramifications of a second approach-one that takes seriously the Court's insistence on doctor involvement in the abortion
decisionmaking process. Despite its imperfections as a response
to the abortion dilemma, the requirement of doctor involvement
has the merit of holding open one of the few remaining legal
channels through which sensitivity to the value of potential life
may be manifested during the early stages of pregnancy. However
cynical one may be about the efficacy of medical judgment as a
safeguard for potential life and about the moral omnicompetence
of the medical profession, one must remember that unfettered
16. See Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles
in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HAW. L. REV. 1, 37 (1973).
17. See, e.g., Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438,450-51 & note (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(apparently interpreting the "joint autonomy" of physician and patient as right of individual women to be free from governmental intrusion in making reproductive choices); L.
TRIBE,
AMERICAN
C O N ~ O N A
LAW
L 933 (1978).
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abortion on demand provides an even lower level of protection for
the value of fetal life. And in fairness to the holdings in Roe v.
Wade and its progeny, reliance on medical judgment may have
reflected not so much a naive effort to submit an intractable
moral problem to a scientific oracle as a practical determination
that no other figure could be interposed in the abortion decisionmaking process with such minimal invasion of the woman's privacy right. After all, the Court may have reasoned, the doctor is
someone the woman must approach about her decision in any
event if she is to have a medically safe abortion, and injecting
some concern for both maternal health and potential life at the
stage of doctor-patient consultation can hardly be said to be an
unreasonable intrusion into the woman's private life. Viewed in
this light, the Court's reliance on the medical profession emerges
as an insightful recognition of the need for a highly individualized
evaluation of specific abortion decisions and as an approach that
may be, at least in certain circumstances, extremely sensitive to
the value of incipient life.
Since the Supreme Court apparently viewed the doctorpatient relationship as a way of injecting such sensitivity into the
abortion choice, a question arises concerning the extent to which
states can enact measures that seek to actualize the doctorpatient mythology on which Roe and its progeny have been premised. Analysis of this question will first require an examination of
the critical components of the doctor-patient relationship as envisioned by the Supreme Court in its principal abortion decisions,
and second, an assessment of a variety of measures aimed a t
shoring up the doctor-patient relationship in an effort to differentiate permissible "myth actualization" from impermissible state
regulation of the abortion decision.
What emerges from this analysis is the recognition that, in a
variety of contexts, a woman's autonomy with respect to the abortion choice is actually expanded rather than contracted by imposing a demand for stronger doctor-patient interaction. And, importantly, greater sensitivity for unborn life is often a concomitant
of expanded autonomy. A woman's autonomy, after all, is protected not by ensuring her the ability to make any choice she
wishes, but by protecting her right to make an informed, calm,
and rational choice.18Thus, while a principal concern of this Arti18. The classic formulation of the notion of autonomy as rational freedom is, of
OF THE METAPHYSIC
OF MOW 98-100,108,114course, Kant's. See I. KANT,GROUNDWORK
16 (H. Paton trans. 1964). For a more current articulation of this Kantian idea, see J.
Etrwrs, A THEORY
OF JUSTICE
515-16 (1971).
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cle is to identify practical steps that can be taken to help stem
the rising tide of fetal deaths within the framework of existing
constitutional adjudication, the Article is not "antichoice" in its
orientation. On the contrary, its aim is to show that a more careful appraisal of Supreme Court abortion decisions suggests a t
least some areas in which permissible state action may encourage
greater sensitivity to fetal life in the very process of enhancing
female autonomy.

A. Three Models of Doctor-Patient Privacy
Despite the Supreme Court's recurrent emphasis on the significance of the doctor-patient relationship in the abortion context, actual indications of the views held by different Justices
concerning the nature of the relationship are relatively sparse.
For the most part, the Court has simply contented itself with
language evoking vague images of sensitive individualized consultation, and differing ideas about doctor-patient interaction
have been papered over in the process. one the less, at least three
distinguishable concepts of the relationship are discernible
among Supreme Court Justices. These views are intimately
linked to varying concepts of the constitutional right of privacy,
and the full significance of the emerging view of the doctorpatient relationship cannot be appreciated until these privacy
concepts are analyzed.
Scholars have long recognized that the constitutional right of
privacy is a convenient label for a number of related but distinguishable rights and values.19 Writing for the majority in Whalen
v. Roe,2oJustice Stevens identified two types of interests principally at issue where the doctor-patient relationship is involved:
"One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters, and another is the interest in independence in making
certain kinds of important de~isions."~~
Particularly since Roe,
the emphasis in this area has been on autonomy.22In Carey v.
19. See, e.g., L. TRIBE,
supra note 17, at 886-89; Gentry, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV.
C.R.X.L.L. REV. 233 (1977); Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy and Personhood, 6 PHILOSOPHY
& PUB.AFF. 26 (1976); Thomson, The Right to Privacy, 4 PHILOSOPHY
& PUB.Am. 295
(1975); Comment, A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose, Sanctuary, and Intimate Decision, 64
CALIF.
L. REV. 1447 (1976); Note, Roe and Paris: Does Privacy Have a Principle?, 26 STAN.
L. REV. 1161 (1974).
20. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
21. Id. at 599-600 (footnotes omitted).
22. See, e:g., Note, Roe and Paris: Does Privacy Have a Principle?, 26 STAN.
L. REV.
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Population Services International, * the Court explicitly described the protections afforded by earlier privacy cases in terms
of the value of individual autonomy.24
To speak of privacy in terms of autonomy, however, is to
speak ambiguously, since the term "autonomy" can be understood in two significantly different ways. According to one view,
autonomy can be understood as the right to unfettered selfdetermination-the right to set one's own course and make one's
own choices regardless of the content of those choices, subject
only to the obligation of according equal respect to the selfdetermination rights of others. This concept of autonomy has
been identified in the works of John Stuart Mill25and has antecedents in the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes." It lies a t the foundation of much of modern libertariani~rn.~
The opposing concept of
autonomy stresses rational choice. As formulated by John Rawls,
people are acting autonomously when "they are acting from principles that they would acknowledge under conditions that best
express their nature as free and equal rational beings."28According to this view not every choice expresses a person's autonomy,
but only those that are made in the absence of distorting factors
that prevent the choice from reflecting a person's authentic individuality.
The distinction between these two concepts of autonomy is
a profound
but the distinction can be described here only
in rough, intuitive terms. The important point for present purposes is that much of the current controversy among Supreme
-

--

1161, 1166 (1974).
23. 431 U.S.678 (1977).
24. Id. at 687.
NEW BEARINGS
IN MORAL
PHIU)SOPHY
25. See, e.g., H. AMEN, REASONAND CONDUCT:
306-07 (1962); Dworkin, Paternalism, in MORALITY
AND THE LAW107, 117 (R.Wasserstrom
ed. 1971). For supporting passages in Mill's own works, in UTILITARIANISM,
LIBERTY,
AND
REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT
see J. MILL,ON LIBERTY,
65-77, 114-31 (1910). The precise
nature of Mill's concept of liberty is not altogether clear. Rawls finds in Mill's defense of
liberty an argument for the value of rational choice. J. RAWLS,supra note 18, at 209-10.
To the extent this reading is accurate, Mill's notion of liberty conforms more closely to
autonomy in the sense of rational choice than in the sense of sheer self-determination.
126-28 (C. Macpherson ed. 1968) (Hobbes defines
26. See T. HOBBES,LEVIATHAN
deliberation as the alternation of appetites and aversions, and rejects the scholastic definition of deliberation as "Rational Appetite").
LIBERTARUNISM
10,49-60 (1971); A. RAND,ATLAS
SHRUGGED
27. See, e.g., J. HOSPERS,
FORA NEWL~BERTY
104-30 (1973).
(1957); M. ROTHBAND,
28. J. RAWLS,supra note 18, at 515.
29. In some senses, the distinction reflects one of the great divides in Western philosoAND REASON 2-3 (1963). It lies at the root, for example, of
phy. See R. HARE,FREEDOM
Unger's contrast between moralities of reason and moralities of desire-a contrast designed to describe the two dominant styles of moral theory in the West. See R. UNGER,
AND POLITICS
49-51 (1975).
KNOWLEDGE
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Court Justices as to the scope of the privacy right is rooted in an
argument about which form of autonomy should ultimately prevail.
To summarize, then, there are a t least three interests arguably safeguarded by the constitutional right of privacy: (1) avoiding disclosure of personal matters, (2) autonomy in the sense of
unfettered self-determination, and (3) autonomy in the sense of
rational choice. As one examines Supreme Court discussions of
the doctor-patient relationship, one detects three corresponding
models of that relationship.
The first model of the doctor-patient relationship could be
characterized as the confidentiality model. It is clearly linked to
the nondisclosure value. This model is perhaps best represented
by Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Roe u. Wade and Doe
u. B ~ l t o n .Although
~@
Justice Douglas alludes to a number of autonomy interests protected by the fourteenth amendment,31his
central concern seems to be protecting the confidentiality of the
doctor-patient relationship. "The right of privacy," he states,
"has no more conspicuous place than in the physician-patient
relationship, unless it be in the priest-penitent relations hi^."^^
Under this model, the woman's privacy right is invaded as soon
as she is compelled to disclose intimate facts about her reproductive life to an outside doctor or, for that matter, to anyone she has
not chosen to tell. According to Justice Douglas, such compulsory
disclosure constitutes "a total destruction of the right of privacy
between physician and patient and the intimacy of relation which
that entail^."^ While this aspect of the privacy right is significant
and may account in part for the prominence given the doctorpatient relationship in many of the abortion decisions, it is considerably less significant to privacy analysis than the autonomy
concerns. The struggle over rival concepts of autonomy is the
locus of much of the Court's current controversy concerning the
scope of a woman's right to an abortion.
A second model of the doctor-patient relationship could be
characterized as the medical expert model. Because of its linkage
with the unfettered self-determination concept of autonomy, this
model takes a rather narrow view of the doctor's role. The doctor
is viewed as a medical specialist who apprises the woman of clinical facts bearing on her decision and then ultimately implements
30.
31.
32.
33.

410 U.S.at 209-21 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Id. at 211-15.
Id. at 219.
Id.
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whatever course of action she selects. The doctor's posture is
completely neutral and value free: the moral component of the
abortion choice is left exclusively to the woman. This model of the
doctor-patient relationship is most clearly articulated by Justice
Brennan in Carey v. Population Services I n t e r n a t i ~ n a l Al.~~
though the Court's concern in Carey is with the role of a physician
in controlling a minor's access to contraceptives, and not in regulating the abortion decision, Justice Brennan's statements nevertheless shed considerable light on his view of the doctor-patient
relationship. Commenting on Doe u. Bolton, he states that the
Court there
doubted that physicians would allow their moral "predilections
on extramarital sex" to interfere with their medical judgments
concerning abortions. Here, however, no medical judgment is
involved at all; the State purports to commission physicians to
engage in moral counseling that can reflect little other than
their private views on the morality of premarital sex among the
young.z5

He then suggests that the reason the doctor-patient relationship
is emphasized in the abortion cases and not in the earlier contraceptive cases is that' "the abortion decision necessarily involves a
medical judgment, . . . while the decision to use a nonhazardous
contraceptive does not."36 Of course, Brennan's analysis of the
difference between the abortion and contraceptive cases conveniently overlooks the fact that the latter do not involve the issue
of unborn life-a probable reason for the emphasis on the doctorpatient relationship in the abortion cases. It seems clear, however, that Brennads view of the doctor's role is a narrowly clinical
one. The only reason the woman's privacy right does not exclude
even her consulting physician from the abortion decision is that
abortion, if nothing more, is still a medical procedure.
This narrow view of the medical role dovetails naturally with
a broad view of the nature of the abortion right. Dissenting in the
Maher case, which was handed down two weeks after Carey,
Brennan was sharply critical of the Court's holding that states
funding normal childbirth need not fund nontherapeutic abortions. In his view, the prior cases had recognized "an area of
34. 431 U.S.678 (1977). Justice Brennan wrote the opinion for the Court in Carey.
However, Part IV of his opinion was joined by only three other Justices. Justice White
concurred in the result of that section of the opinion.
35. Id. at 699 n.24 (emphasis in original) (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 196
(1973)).
36. Id. at 699-700 n.25.
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privacy invulnerable to the State's intrusion surround[ing] the
decision of a pregnant woman whether or not to carry her pregnancy to term?' He viewed state measures that altered the incentive structure surrounding the abortion choice as "an obvious
impairment of the fundamental right established by Roe v.
Wade. "3g This uncompromising interpretation of the woman's
right to an abortion shows Justice Brennan's commitment to the
value of autonomy in the sense of unfettered self-determination.
If the woman's right to self-determination is the ultimate value,
the doctork role is naturally constricted; he serves merely as the
instrument of her will.
The third model of the doctor-patient relationship could be
described as the medical counselor model. This is the model behind the Supreme Court's doctor-patient mythology, and it is
founded on the rational choice concept of autonomy. Under this
model, the consulting physician performs the tasks of the doctor
as medical expert, but additionally assumes a larger interpersonal responsibility. The physician ensures that the woman is in
a position not only to rationally assess the narrow medical issues,
but also to evaluate carefully the nonmedical aspects of abortion.
It is this highly personalized role the Court initially had in mind
when it stressed that "medical judgment may be exercised in the
light of all factors-physical, emotional, psychological, familial,
and the woman's age-relevant to the well-being of the patient.""
Since medical considerations alone will rarely dictate the
outcome of the abortion choice,40the Supreme Court's stress on
the doctor-patient relationship is naturally interpreted as an implicit reference to the desirability of the medical counselor model.
Indeed, a state may have a strong interest in encouraging relationships of the medical counselor rather than the medical expert
variety. Given the state's legitimate (if noncompelling) interest
in encouraging normal childbirth during the first two trime~ters,~'
the state may be anxious to encourage a woman's full consideration of all factors that might lead her to continue her pregnancy.
Although severe constraints have been imposed on the state's
authority to restrict abortions, the state may nonetheless wish to
maximize the probability that women will choose to continue
37. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 484 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 484-85.
39. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973).
40. See Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf:A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALEL.J.
920, 922 n.22 (1973) (quoting Stone, Abortion and the Supreme Court, MOD.
MED.,April
30, 1973, at 32, 36).
41. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 446 (1977).
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their pregnancies. Of course, the attending physician is not the
only person capable of helping the woman fully to consider the
alternatives to abortion.42But the Supreme Court's progressive
insulation of the doctor-patient relationship has raised doubts
concerning the appropriateness of legislation compelling consultation with other individual^.^^ Efforts to implement the medical
counselor model may accordingly be the only remaining alternative for providing a woman with the information necessary to a
rational abortion decision.
Even disregarding the concern for unborn life, the argument
can be made that the concept of autonomy as rational choice
should be preferred to that of autonomy as unfettered selfdetermination. The Supreme Court's careful refusal to establish
a constitutional right to abortion on demand is undoubtedly the
clearest indicator that the value of rational choice, rather than
that of self-determination in itself, lies at the core of the constitutional right of privacy. Reinforcing this view is the Court's holding in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth that informed consent
requirements are permissible because they help assure that the
woman's abortion choice is "made with full knowledge of its nature and consequence^."^^ The doctor-patient relationship falls
within the penumbra of the privacy right because it maximizes
the woman's rational choice autonomy. What the Court has
sought to protect is not any decision the woman happens to make,
regardless of the extent to which it is a reflection of emotional
stress and possibly inadequate information. On the contrary, the
Court has tried to promote careful decisions, conscientiously
made after consideration of all the facts and alternatives.
There are, of course, problems with the notion of allowing the
state to determine when an individual decision is sufficiently
rational to be immune from state review.45This is unlikely to
42. An appropriately trained social worker, for example, might be able to perform this
service with greater competence and with lower fees.
43. See notes 87-89, 284-90 and accompanying text infra.
44. 428 U.S. 52, 67 (1976).
45. At bottom, the difficulty is the one common to so-called real-will theories. As
Jeffrie Murphy phrases the objection, "Surely we want to avoid cramming indignities
down the throats of people with the offhand observation that, no matter how much they
scream, they are really rationally willing every bit of it. It would be particularly ironic for
such arbitrary repression to come under the mask of respecting autonomy." Murphy,
Marxism and Retribution, 2 F'IULOSOPHY & PUB.Am. 217, 230 (1973). For criticism of realwill theories, see I. BERLIN,
TWOCONCEPTS
OF LIBERTY,
in FOURESSAYS
ON LIBERTY
(1969);
Dworkin, supra note 25, a t 119.
As both Murphy and Dworkin recognize, albeit for different reasons, state constraints
that respect only rational choices, as opposed to arbitrary personal desires, may make
sense under appropriate circumstances. See Dworkin, supra note 25, at 119-26; Murphy,
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become a problem in the abortion setting, however, as constitutional norms preclude the creation of previability veto rights over
the woman's ultimate
Legislation designed to inform
and sensitize without predetermining decisional outcomes can do
nothing but expand female autonomy. Increased information
may make the abortion choice more difficult, but this is not because the woman is being pressured to do something against her
will. Rather, it is because the woman is led to feel the responsibility for her decision more keenly. Only those sympathetic to the
arguments of Dostoyevsky's Grand Inquisitor4' would perceive
this burden as an incursion on autonomy. In any event, when one
adds concern for unborn life into the equation, the argument in
the abortion context for protecting the woman's autonomy in the
sense of rational rather than arbitrary choice seems overpowering.

B. Components of the Doctor-Patient Relationship
The foregoing analysis suggests that the rational choice version of autonomy and the associated medical counselor model of
the doctor-patient relationship are emerging as dominant concepts in the Supreme Court's abortion cases. Assuming this analysis is accurate, it becomes vital to identify those features of the
doctor-patient relationship that are either expressly considered or
impliedly mandated by the Court's emerging view. Clearly, measures aimed a t reinforcing these aspects of the doctor-patient
relationship are the ones most likely to withstand constitutional
scrutiny.
1. Screening

One obvious component of the doctor-patient relationship
contemplated by the Supreme Court is thorough patient screening.VI'he Court has always stressed that medical judgment
should be "exercised in the light of all factors . . . relevant to the
well-being of the patient."49 The Court's willingness to sustain
recordkeeping and reporting procedures in Danforth6' and its atsupra at 238-43. So long as the state's efforts are limited to providing information to the
woman considering abortion, and are not permitted to determine the result of the process,
the dangers ascribed to more extreme real-will theories do not apply.
46. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69, 74 (1976).
47. F. DOSTOYEVSKY,
THEBROTHERS
KARAMAZOV
292-314 (C. Garnett trans. 1950).
48. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973). See generally Butler & Fujita,
Abortion Screening and Counseling: A Brief Guideline for Physicians, 50 POSTGRADUATE
MED.
208, 208 (1971).
49. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U S . at 192.
50. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U S . 52, 79-81 (1976).
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tention in Doe v. Bolton to the possibility that a physician might
consult with another doctor in a "doubtful situation" or when the
"medical decision is a delicate one"51provide additional evidence
of the Court's concern for information that might be yielded by
screening. The variety of factors to be considered by the doctor
in the exercise of his or her medical judgment presupposes that
the doctor will thoroughly assess the patient's individual needs.
The Court's concerns are linked to practical demands for
thorough patient screening. Among other things, the fact of pregnancy itself needs to be established; the number of "abortions"
which have been performed on nonpregnant women is extremely
disconcertingP2 More generally, a woman's overall health and
medical history may have great impact on the relative safety of
continued pregnancy or abortion." Equally significant is the need
to screen the patient to identify pertinent psychological and sociological characteristics. Recent studies indicate that many
women contemplating abortion have apprehensions, unresolved
conflicts, or feelings of ambivalence regarding abortion." Women
from strict religious or moral backgrounds or women with previous histories of emotional instability have a particularly great
tendency to develop psychological complications following abortion? If the doctor is to exercise his best medical judgment, he
must have a thorough knowledge of the woman's psychological
and emotional traits.
Family background must also be dealt with by both doctor
and patient? Both must evaluate the family's capacity to deal
with the realities of pregnancy and additional offspring. The feelings of the woman's family and partner about abortion may have
a profound impact on her own ability to deal with the a b o r t i ~ n , ~
and this impact must therefore be considered.
51. 410 U.S. at 199.
52. "An estimated 20 to 30.percentof criminal abortionshave been done on nonpregnant women." Butler & Fujita, supra note 48, at 208.
53. See, e.g., DEP'TOF MEDICINE
& PUBLIC
AFFAIRS,GEORGE
WASHINGTON
U ~ m m
MEDICAL
CENTER,
SERIES F, POPULATION
REPORTS
69-70 (1976).
54. Bracken, Psychosomatic Aspects of Abortion: Implications for Counseling, 19 J.
R E P R O D U ~MED.
V E 265 (1977); Nadelson, Abortion Counselling: Focus on Adolescent
765, 767 (1974); West & Walsh, The Need for Pre-Abortion
Pregnancy, 54 PEDIATRICS
Counseling-Now More Than Ever, 59 NEB.MED. J. 34 (1974).
55. See Belsey, Greer, Lal, Lewis, & Beard, Predictive Factors in Emotional Response
to Abortion: King's Termination Study-IV, 11 SOC.S a . & MED.71,80-81(1977); Osofsky
& Osofsky, The Psychological Reaction of Patients to Legalized Abortion, 42 AM. J .
ORTHOPSYCH.
48, 58 (1972); West & Walsh, supra note 54, at 35.
56. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973); Belsey, Greer, Lal, Lewis,& Beard,
supra note 55, at 266.
57. Belsey, Greer, Lal, Lewis, & Beard, supra note 55, at 80-81; Bracken, supra note
54, at 266.
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2. Informing the patient as to the nature and consequences of
the procedure

Another component of the relationship contemplated by the
Supreme Court is the responsibility of the doctor to inform the
patient of the facts she needs to make her own decision. In
Danforth the Supreme Court acknowledged that the decision to
abort is a stressful one and that "it is desirable and imperative
that it be made with full knowledge of its nature and consequences."" In so holding, the Supreme Court recognized that a
woman's right to choose to have an abortion is an empty one if it
is not accompanied by sufficient information to help her make
that choice an intelligent and informed one. The doctor may be
the only individual in a position to help protect the woman's
autonomy in this manner, since he or she may be the only person
who is both qualified to provide her the needed information and
aware that she is contemplating an abortion.
The woman deciding whether or not to have an abortion
vitally needs information in several particular areas. She needs
to understand the facts of female reproduction and fetal development. These are critical to her understanding of the abortion
procedure itself. Accurate understanding of fetal development
may bear directly on whether a woman will choose to have an
abortion and may also have a significant impact on her mental
health after having one.5@A woman may choose not to end a
pregnancy if she learns that a fetus as few as eight weeks old is a
minature human being rather than a blob of p r o t o p l a ~ mor
, ~ if
she learns that the fetus she is carrying is just a few weeks from
viability. Some women have reported experiencing severe mental
distress as a result of learning the facts of fetal development after
obtaining an ab~rtion.~'
As any other medical patient, a woman contemplating abortion needs information about the procedure to be performed on
her and possible complications of that procedure." A variety of
58. 428 U.S. a t 67.
59. See, e.g., 124 CONG.REC. 6 2648, 6 2649 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1978) (testimony of
Sen. Helms concerning § 2614); Letter from James E. Scoresby to Arizona House of
Representatives in support of Arizona House bill 2193 (Mar. 25, 1978) (on file with the
Brigham Young University Law Review).
60. Life Before Birth 10, reprinted from LIFE,Apr. 30, 1965 (Educational Reprint No.
27).
61. See authorities cited note 59 supra.
62. The need for medical patients to know about the treatment they are to receive is
the basis for the tort concept of informed consent, which stems from the ancient law of
battery. Slater v. Baker, 95 Eng. Rep. 860, 862 (K.B. 1767). The concept has developed
to include disclosure of the nature of the procedure to be performed, and information
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abortion procedures can be used at each stage of the pregnancy."
Women who are contemplating an abortion need to understand
the procedure the doctor will employ. A woman who knows what
to expect during the procedure will experience less anxiety.64In
abortions during later stages of pregnancy, women should be informed of the possibility of the fetus being born alive. Women
who have late abortions for reasons other than not wanting the
child have a special interest in learning which procedure will most
likely end the pregnancy without necessarily killing the fetus.
While it is relatively easy to provide a woman with a description of the abortion procedure, it is more difficult to give helpful
concerning risks and alternatives to the procedure. Katz, Informed Consent-A Fairy
Tale? Law 's Vision, 39 U. Prm. L. REV. 137, 146-48(1978). The cause of action for medicai
malpractice based on failure to obtain informed consent became commonly recognized as
an action for negligence. Plant, The Decline of "Informed Consent," 35 WASH.& LEEL.
REV. 91, 92 (1978). Two different standards of care evolved. The earlier and currently
majority view involves application of a "professional standard," requiring physicians to
disclose the information that a "reasonable and prudent medical doctor of the same school
of practice as the defendant under similar circumstances" would disclose. Natanson v.
Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 411, 350 P.2d 1093, 1107 (1960). Courts, however, have increasingly
adopted a "full disclosure" standard, requiring the physician to disclose "all material risks
inherent in the proposed treatment." Seidelson, Medical Malpractice: Informed Consent
Cases in "Full-Disclosure" Jurisdictions, 14 Due. L. REV.309, 310 (1976). The standard
is based on a patient's right to self-determination and is a standard "set by law for
physicians rather than one which physicians may or may not impose upon themselves."
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 784 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
Theoretically, a standard "set by law" would diminish the need for expert testimony in
informed consent litigation; however, that diminution may be insignificant if expert testimony is needed to "identify and elucidate for the factfinder the risks of therapy and the
consequences of leaving existing maladies untreated." Id. a t 791-92.
63. This is particularly true of abortions performed after the first trimester. Most
abortions before 12 weeks' gestation are performed either by dilation and curettage or by
& PUBLIC
AFFAIRS,
GEORGE
WASHINGTON
UNIVERSITY
vacuum aspiration. DEP'TOF MEDICINE
MEDICAL
REPORTS10 (1973). In either case, the cervix is
CENTER,SERIESF, POPULATION
dilated and the contents of the uterus are either scraped or vacuumed out. In the first
trimester of pregnancy, the obvious result will be destruction of the fetus. These methods
& M. MURSTEIN,
may be used for periods up to 14 weeks of gestation. Id. at 28; C. TIETZE
supra note 8, at 44.
After the first trimester, abortions can be performed by saline amniocentesis, in which
some of the amniotic fluid is removed from the uterus and replaced with a salt solution.
Usually the fetus dies and labor begins. DEP'T OF MEDICINE
& PUBLIC
AFFAIRS,
GEORGE
WASHINGTON
UNIVERSITY
MEDICAL
CENTER,
SERIESF, POPULATION
REPORTS68 (1975). Prostaglandin is also used to stimulate the onset of labor. Prostaglandin may be placed in the
amniotic sac as in saline amniocentesis or it may be inserted vaginally. Id. at 72-76.
Hysterotomy, another method of post-first-trimester abortion, is like a miniature caesarean section. An incision is made in the abdomen and the fetus is removed. Id. a t 67.
Rarely will the fetus survive an abortion performed by saline amniocentesis, but occasionally it does. Id. at 68. Prostaglandins or hysterotomy are somewhat more likely to produce
a live fetus. Id. at 67, 76. There are numerous other methods of performing abortions that
are not commonly used in the United States. Id. a t 67.
64. Bracken, supra note 54, at 266; Nadelson, supra note 54, at 769.
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information about abortion complications. The incidence and
severity of possible complications varies with the procedure used,
the stage of pregnancy, and the woman's overall health." With
the extent of today's research, however, it is surprisingly difficult
to estimate the risk of complications in the abortion process.
Although recent studies in the United States indicate that the
risk of complications is decreasing as doctors develop greater experience in performing abortion^,^^ the fact remains that we have
a brief history in the United States of free access to abortion, and
the studies that have been done are not extensive? Moreover, it
is difficult to counter the argument that since most abortions are
performed in abortion clinics," we may not be getting an accurate
idea of the number of complications stemming from abortion. A
woman who receives an abortion in a clinic may not return to that
clinic if she is experiencing complications; she may be more likely
to go to her family doctor or to the emergency room of a hospital.
This difficulty is cbmpounded by the fact that many women
65. Generally, the possible physical complications of abortion include allergic response to anesthesia, excessive blood loss, hypertension, fever, infection, retained products of conception, cervical and uterine injuries, a possible tendency toward miscarriages
&
or premature births in later pregnancies, and Rh immunization. DEP'T OF MEDICINE
PUBLIC
AFFAIRS,GEORGE
WASHINGTON
UNIVERSITY
MEDICAL
CENTER,SERIESF, POPULATION
REPORTS
31-36 (1973). Post-first-trimester abortions include the possibility of more severe
and perhaps life-threatening complications, especially in women with preexisting disorders such as sickle cell anemia, other moderate or severe anemia, cardiac or cardiovascular
& PUBLIC
AFFAIRS,GEORGE
WASHINGTON
disorders, or renal disorders. DEP'TOF MEDICINE
R E P O ~69-70
S
(1976). The incidence
UNIVERSITY
MEDICAL
CENTER,
SERIESF, POPULATION
of morbidity and mortality stemming from abortion increases dramatically after the first
trimester. Id. a t 65.
In addition to these potential physical complications, there may be emotional or
mental complications stemming from abortion, particularly for women who come from
strict religious or moral backgrounds, Osofsky & Osofsky, supra note 55, a t 58; West &
Walsh, supra note 54, at 35, who already suffer from a degree of mental or emotional
instability, Belsey, Greer, Lal, Lewis, & Beard, supra note 55, a t 81, or who are under age
18, Bracken, Phil, Hachomovitch, & Grossman, The Decision to Abort and Psychological
Sequelae, 158 J . NERVOUS
& MENTAL
DISEASE154, 155 (1974); Goldsmith, Gabrielson,
Gabrielson, Mathews, & Potts, Teenagers, Sex, and Contraception, 4 FAM.PLAN.
PERSPECTIVES
32, 35 (1972); Nadelson, supra note 54, a t 766.
66. C. ~ E T Z E& M. MURSTEIN,
supra note 8, a t 52-53.
67. Id. a t 51. Of course, we cannot afford to ignore the studies of complications of
abortion conducted in other countries with longer histories of free access to abortion than
our country. Hayasaka, Toda, Zimmerman, Ueno, & Ishizaki, Japan's 22 Year Experience
With a Liberal Abortion Law, in Hearing on S.J. Res. I19 and S.J. Res. 130 Before the
Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 661, 667 (1976). The complications noted in these studies, such as sterility
or increased premature births in later pregnancies, may not appear until years after the
abortion or until the woman has had more than one abortion. Id.; Schwartz, The Impact
of Voluntary Abortion on American Obstetrics and Gynecology, 42 MT. SINAIJ. MED.,
N.Y. 468, 473 (1975).
68. See note 13 supra.
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travel outside their own communities to obtain abortions, in part
because those providing abortions are often concentrated in one
or two metropolitan areas in a state," and in part because women
seeking abortions may wish to minimize the risk that anyone in
their own community would learn about the abortion. Until effective followup methods are developed, it may be some time before
accurate statistics on abortion complications are available.
Because of the difficulty of estimating the likelihood of abortion complications, some may argue that informing a woman in
detail about a great variety of improbable but possible complications will not influence her decision whether or not to have an
abortion, but may make her unnecessarily fearful about the procedure.'O However, the trend is for patients to prefer greater specificity on the part of the physician in outlining the risks associated with a particular operation? For example, a study of patient reactions to "straightforward and perhaps even harsh" information concerning the possible complications of angiography
showed the information was welcomed by patients and did not
appear to make them more fearful of the pr~cedure.'~
There is no
reason to think patient reaction in the abortion context would be
appreciably different. Most women would prefer to make a decision autonomously-with complete information-rather than
leave the decision to a paternalistic physician attempting to
"protect" her from preoperation anxiety.
3. Consideration of alternatives

A woman's awareness of various possible answers to a problem pregnancy is also critical to her decisionmaking process. A
frequently publicized HEW study concluded that there were no
alternatives to abortion except suicide, motherhood, and madn e s ~ . 'Obviously
~
such a cynical view will not be helpful to the
woman facing a problem pregnancy. Women contemplating abortion for health reasons need information about other medical
treatments that would permit them to maintain their health
69. Sullivan, Tietze, & Dryfoos, supra note 13, at 121, 124.
70. See, e.g., Schneyer, Informed Consent and the Danger of Bias in the Formation
of Medical Disclosure Practices, 1976 WIS. L. REV. 124, 132 n.28 (citing Fost, A Surrogate
System for Informed Consent, 233 J.A.M.A. 800 (1975)).
71. See Alfidi, Informed Consent: A Study of Patient Reaction, 216 J.A.M.A. 1325
(1971).
72. Id.
73. O'Reilly, Okay, Mr. Califano, Consider the Alteratives to Abortion . . ., MS.,
May 1978, at 74. The study referred to in this article has never been released, and Freedom
of Information Act requests for information concerning the study have been, at least as of
this printing, ignored.
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while continuing their pregnancy to term.74Likewise, women contemplating abortion because of marital status, lack of financial
resources, or inability to care for another child need information
about available public and private assistance for the pregnant
~ o m a n . ~ V o m ewho
n have such information about alternatives
will be capable of making more informed decisions.
4.

Conscious exercise of medical judgment

A somewhat less obvious but equally significant feature of
the Supreme Court's idealization of the doctor-patient relationship is its emphasis on the conscious exercise of medical judgment in the abortion decisionmaking process. That the doctor is
expected to take an active role in this process is apparent from a
number of the Court's statements. After cataloguing the factors
that may bear on the abortion decision, such as medically diagnosable harm, additional offspring, "distressful life and future,"
and psychological harm, the Court in Roe concludes: "All these
are factors the woman and her responsible physician necessarily
will consider in ~onsultation."~~
In summarizing its holding regarding the first trimester of pregnancy, the Court goes so far as
74. Physicians report that there are few medical indications for abortion:
"[Mledical advances have made it possible for women with almost any kind of physical
illness to survive pregnancy and childbirth . . . ." Schwartz, Abortion on Request: The
SOCIETY,
AND THE LAW139, 141 (D. Walbert & J.
Rqychiatric Indications, in ABORTION,
Butler eds. 1973). One physician discusses possible maternal health indications for abortion as including cardiovascular disease, ulcerative colitis, renal disease, neurological
disease, tuberculosis, diabetes mellitus, and malignancy. He qualifies the discussion,
however: "The paucity of recent papers in the medical literature recommending abortion
for medical disease or even describing the effect of medical diseases on pregnancy . . .
undoubtedly reflects the infrequency with which medical disease is now thought to indicate abortion." He concludes that proper management of all but the most severe conditions could allow a pregnancy to continue to term. Niswander, Abortion Practices in the
AND THE LAW199, 202-06 (D.
(Jnited States: A Medical Viewpoint. in ASORTION,SOCIETY,
Walbert & J. Butler eds. 1973).
75. Public assistance for abortion alternatives may presently be available on an individual basis in many states through a combination of various benefits from federally
funded programs such as Medicaid, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396k (1976) (medical assistance
payments for pregnancy, childbirth, and infant health care assistance); title XX of the
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 94 1397-1397f (1976) (additional source of assistance for
pregnancy-related expenses); and title V of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 44 701-710
(1976) (pregnancy counseling, nutritional care, and child health care counseling), with
state-funded adoption subsidy programs, see, e.g., Katz, Subsidized Adoption in America,
10 FAM.L.Q. 1 (1976).
Religious organizations often have established programs for financial support of
"unwed mothers" or other women with unwanted pregnancies. See, e.g., Searle, Adoption
Program Aids Mother, Child (1973) (pamphlet, available from the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints, Social Services Dep't, Salt Lake City, Utah).
76. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
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to state that "the abortion decision and its effectuation must be
left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending
phy~ician."~~
The Court here depicts the ultimate abortion decision as one that is made not by the consenting woman, but by her
doctor. This view is further reinforced by the Court's statement
that during the first trimester "the abortion decision in all its
aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision, and
basic responsibility for it must rest with the physician. If an
individual practitioner abuses the privilege of exercising proper
medical judgment, the usual remedies, judicial and intraprofessional, are a ~ a i l a b l e . "This
~ ~ language appears to confer
authority on the physician under appropriate circumstances to
refuse a woman's request for an abortion if he does not believe the
circumstances warrant ~ n e , ~ % nto
d countenance legal and professional sanctions-even in the first trimester-for abuse of the
"responsibility" of exercising such judgment. As a practical matter, the restraining force of a physician's refusal is minimal because of the probability in contemporary American society that
a woman who desires an abortion can find another physician who
views her situation differently and who is willing to perform an
abortion at her request?O Nonetheless, the language is significant
in evidencing the Supreme Court's view that the consulting physician is to play a major role in making the abortion decision.
As noted at the outset,R1the Court's insistence on the conscious exercise of medical judgment in the abortion decisionmaking process is rooted in a concern to achieve some sensitivity in
77. Id. a t 164.
78. Id. a t 166 (emphasis added). Justice Blackmun's opinion fails to indicate what
his reference to the "usual remedies" implied. He was possibly thinking of malpractice
actions as well as formal professional disciplinary proceedings and informal sanctions such
as loss of the professional regard of one's peers. If the judicial remedies he contemplated
were limited to malpractice, one could infer-contrary to what we are arguing-that the
scope of the medical judgment he envisioned was narrowly limited to matters of medical
or surgical technique. This narrow clinical conception of medical judgment, however,
seems inconsistent with the larger and more personal consultative role assigned to the
doctor in other parts of the opinion.
79. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976). But cf. Note, The AborU.L.Q. 167, 184
tion Alternative and the Patient's Right to Know, 1978 WASH.
1hereinafter cited as Abortion Alternative].
80. One of the glaring inconsistencies of Justice Blackmun's opinions for the Court
in Roe and Doe is that they recognize the "emotional nature of the abortion controversy"
and "the vigorous opposing views, even among physicians . . . that the subject inspires,"
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 116, and yet the opinions assume in a number of passages that
the doctor-patient relationship will play a significant role in protecting potential life. See.
e . g , Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 197. As long as the patient is free to select a doctor with
pro-abortion views, the influence of the medical profession in inhibiting unnecessary abortions will obviously be weak.
81. See notes 8-12 and accompanying text supra.
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balancing interests between female autonomy and fetal life. The
Court apparently reasoned that this end could best be obtained
by relying on the judgment of the consulting physician. He or she
would presumably be in a position to evaluate the woman's physical, emotional, psychological, and familial needs, and at the same
time would be able to give due weight to the value of incipient
life in reaching the abortion decision. Viewed with the benefit of
with their
hindsight afforded by Beal v. Doem and Maher v.
recognition of strong and legitimate state interests in fetal life
throughout p r e g n a n ~ ythe
, ~ ~Court's holding in Roe may be interpreted as a determination that during the first trimester sufficient protection of the relevant state interests is afforded by consultation with the p h y ~ i c i a n Accordingly,
.~~
the Court's conclusion seems merely to be that the state's interests in maternal
health and potential life do not become sufficiently compelling to
warrant overriding the decision reached by the woman and her
doctor until later stages in pregnancy.
This conclusion does not imply that concern for fetal life is
to be totally abandoned during the first trimester. On the contrary, the Court expressly recognized the significance of the doctor's role in protecting the value of potential life in Doe v. Bolton.
There, in the course of invalidating first trimester hospital committee review procedures, the Court stated, "[wlith regard to
the protection of potential life, the medical judgment is already
completed prior to the committee stage, and review by a committee once removed from diagnosis is basically r e d ~ n d a n t . " ~ T h e
Court's insistence on the involvement of the medical profession
in first trimester abortion decisions thus reflects a considered
judgment about how the countervailing interests in protecting
incipient life and preserving a woman's autonomy can be reconciled during early stages of pregnancy. Reemphasizing the significance of the conscious exercise of medical judgment in abortion
consultations may accordingly provide the foundation for a more
sensitive interpretation of the Supreme Court's abortion decisions.
82. 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
83. 432 U.S. 464 (1977). See notes 94-104 and accompanying text infra.
84. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 478; Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. at 446.
85. Justice Powell's statement in Maher that the decision not to require state funding
of nontherapeutic abortions "signals no retreat from Roe or the cases applying it," 432
U.S. at 475, takes on added significance in this context. It implies that earlier interpretations of Roe, which read too much into the Court's recognition of a woman's right to obtain
an abortion and attached too little significance to its concern for potential life, were
unfounded.
86. 410 U.S. 179, 197 (1973) (emphasis added).
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C. The Current Constitutional Parameters
In order to evaluate concrete proposals aimed at strengthening the doctor-patient relationship, an understanding of the precise constitutional limits on state action affecting the abortion
decision is vital. The major impact of the Court's rulings, of
course, has been to insulate the doctor-patient reelationshipfrom
outside influences. Beginning with Roe v. Wade, the Court held
that, at least during the first trimester, doctor and patient may
make and implement the abortion choice "without regulation
[or] . . . interference by the State."n7Doe v. Bolton went a step
further by invalidating a scheme that conditioned access to abortion on hospital committee approval or on concurrence by other
medical professional^.^^ Finally, in Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth," the Court invalidated parental and spousal consent
requirements, thus insulating the doctor-patient decisionmaking
process from familial vetoes.
In general, then, the doctor-patient relationship is seen as a
private affair that should not be subjected to interference from
the state, the medical profession, or other interested parties in the
absence of compelling state interests. A distressing side effect of
this progressive insulation of the doctor-patient relationship in all
too many cases is the increasing isolation of the pregnant woman
from a number of the support systems that would normally assist
her in making an extremely difficult decision. Given the Court's
recognition of the stressful nature of the abortion choice,9oone
implication of the recent decisions is that a greater share of the
emotional burden of making the abortion decision is concentrated
exclusively in the doctor-patient relationship. This would appear
to create a demand for heightened sensitivity on the part of the
consulting physician.
Consistent with this demand for heightened sensitivity, and
notwithstanding the strong language in Roe suggesting the absolute impermissibility of state regulation of the abortion choice
during the first trimester," the Supreme Court has subsequently
made it clear that some minimal constraints on the doctorpatient relationship are appropriate from the time of conception.
87. 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
88. 410 U.S. 179, 197-200 (1973).
89. 428 U.S. 52, 67-75 (1976).
90. Id. at 67.
91. 410 U.S.113, 163 (1973). See Friendship Medical Center, Ltd. v. Chicago Bd. of
Health, ,505F.2d 1141 (7th Cir. 1974) (invalidating regulations establishing sanitation and
equipment requirements for abortion facilities), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975).
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States may continue to require that abortions be performed only
by licensed physicians and may subject persons performing abortions without such authority to criminal sanction^.^^ Moreover,
the Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth specifically sustained statutory provisions establishing recordkeeping
and reporting procedures and making the woman's informed consent a necessary precondition for a lawful a b ~ r t i o n . ~ "
The clearest articulation of the scope of permissible state
action during the first trimester occurs in Maher v. Roe,g4where
the Court sustained a state regulation limiting Medicaid benefits
for first trimester abortions to those that are "medically necessary." Commenting on prior privacy cases, the Court stated,
Roe did not declare an unqualified "constitutional right to an
abortion" . . . . Rather, the right protects the woman from
unduly burdensome interference with hsr freedom to decide
whether to terminate her pregnancy. It implies no limitation on
the authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring
childbirth over abortion, and to implement that judgment by
the allocation of public funds.95

The criminal abartion statutes invalidated by Roe and the
spousal and parental consent requirements struck down in
Danforth were thus objectionable not merely because they constituted state regulation within a protected zone of privacy, but
because they were "unduly burdensome interference" with the
abortion choice. They constituted state-created obstacles to the
effectuation of the abortion decision independently reached by a
woman and her consulting p h y ~ i c i a n The
. ~ ~ Maher Court acknowledged that a state's failure to fund nontherapeutic abortions might make it difficult or even impossible for indigent
women to obtain abortions.g7The Court reasoned, however, that
this lack of access resulted not from affirmative state action but
from the women's indigency, and that the state had no affirmative obligation to finance the termination of a potential human
life.gXThe conclusion, then, was that states are free to influence
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9 (1975).
428 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1976). See Section In infra (discussion of informed consent).
432 U S . 464 (1977).
Id. at 473-74 (emphasis added).
Id. at 473. Chief Justice Burger formulated this notion by stating that the

"legislative determination [to finance certain childbirth expenses] places no statecreated barrier to a woman's choice to procure an abortion . . . ." Id. at 481-82 (Burger,
C.J., concurring).
97. Id. at 474.
98. Id. at 474, 479-80.
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the abortion choice by shaping incentive structures to accord with
legitimate state policies, even during the first trimester, so long
as no affirmative state action unduly interferes with the decision
to continue or terminate the p r e g n a n ~ y . ~ ~
In this Article, the concern is not so much with state action
t h a t alters the incentive structure surrounding the abortion
choice as with state action designed simply to shore up the
doctor-patient relationship and to make certain that a meaningful relationship emerges. But in both areas the question is much
the same. At what point does permissible fostering of legitimate
state interests blur over into impermissible regulation of the abortion choice? When do regulatory efforts become "unduly burdensome interference with [the woman's] freedom to decide whether
or not to terminate her pregnancy?"loOOne of the central teachings of Maher is that wherever that line lies, it cannot be identified simply by drawing a magic circle around the woman and her
doctor and proscribing any law whose influence reaches inside it.
As one scholar has noted, one cannot simply view "the zone of
privacy as a legal island of personal autonomy in the midst of a
sea of public regulation and interaction," because that metaphor
fails to clarify what constitutes an impermissible "coming
ashore."'" The virtue of the Court's analysis in Maher is that it
recognizes that the issue is one of degree-one of assessing what
constitutes an "unduly burdensome interferencev-and that in
the abortion context, this question cannot be answered without
assessing the significance of the state's interest in potential life.
While only compelling state interests justify state nullification of
decisions reached by a woman and her doctor, the state has a
"strong and legitimate interest in encouraging normal childbirth"IM which "exists throughout the pregnancy."lM If this significant, though not compelling, interest is sufficiently potent to
warrant first-trimester regulations that provide strong incentives
for a decision to continue a pregnancy, as Maher implies, then
surely requirements designed merely to assure meaningful doctorpatient interaction (without prescribing the decisional outcome
of such interaction) must also be permissible.lo4
99. Id. at 474-78 & nn.8-10.
100. Id. at 474.
101. Gentry, supra note 19, at 271.
102. Beai v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 446 (1977).
103. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 478 (1977).
104. A narrower interpretation of Maher that might preclude this conclusion could
he developed on the basis of Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). which
was decided just two weeks before Maher. In Carey, the Court invalidated a New York
statute regulating the sale and distribution of nonprescription contraceptives, holding
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The first part of this Article has suggested that Supreme
Court cases dealing with abortion, while drastically limiting the
range of permissible state regulation of the abortion choice, have
not altogether precluded state action that encourages heightened
sensitivity to the value of unborn life. We have argued that although there is much that can be said in criticism of the Supreme
Court's attempt to resolve the abortion dilemma by insisting on
doctor involvement in the abortion decisionmaking process, the
residual merits of that approach in terms of maintaining some
respect for the value of fetal life while maintaining sufficient
flexibility for female autonomy have not been fully appreciated.
Once one begins to recognize the doctor-patient relationship as a
vehicle for enhancing the woman's rational autonomy and for
imposing noncoercive constraints on the decision to terminate
fetal life, it becomes obvious that there are a number of things a
that no compelling state interest justified the regulations in question. The Maher majority
was able to conclude that gtates need not fund nontherapeutic abortions by reasoning that
a state's decision to withhold funds in this manner impinged on no fundamental interests
that would require a compelling state interest test. Arguably, the only distinction between
Maher and Carey with regard to the applicability of a compelling state interest test is that
(brey involved affirmative state action. Justice Powell, writing for the Maher majority,
indicated that Maher "signal[ed] no retreat from Roe," 432 U.S. a t 475, and he stressed
the distinction between direct burdens and nonproffered advantages. See id. at 475 n.9.
If this analysis is accurate, any regulation imposed on the doctor-patient relationship
during the first trimester other than legislative refusals to affirmatively support abortion
decisions through funding or otherwise would require use of the compelling state interest
test.
Carey and Maher, however, can be harmonized on a basis that gives broader scope
to the "unduly burdensome interference" rationale of Maher. Part of the reason for the
difference between the two cases was that the New York regulatory scheme in Carey was
not well crafted to meet its apparent ends. As Justice Stevens stated regarding the legislation's prohibition of contraceptive sales to minors under age sixteen, "[ilt is as though a
State decided to dramatize its disapproval of motorcycles by forbidding the use of safety
helmets." 431 U.S. at 715 (Stevens, J., concurring). Even Justice Powell, who maintained
that the majority erred by invoking the compelling state interest test, concurred in the
result on the ground that there were no state interests of sufficient magnitude to justify
the regulations as drafted. See id. at 707-08 (Powell, J., concurring). More significantly,
Carey merely held that the compelling state interest test comes into play when state
regulations "burden an individual's right to decide to prevent contraception or terminate
pregnancy by substantially limiting access to the means of effectuating that decision
. . . ." Id. a t 688 (emphasis added). See id. a t 688 n.5. The regulations in question in
Carey were characterized as imposing "a significant burden on the right of individuals to
use contraceptives . . ." Id. at 689 (emphasis added). This language recognizes the
analysis in Maher that at the boundaries the question of invasion of privacy is inescapably
a question of degree-a question of "unduly burdensome interference." Carey leaves open
the possibility that various state measures-even some going beyond mere nonsupport-may be constitutionally permissible.

.
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state can do to enhance the efficacy of the doctor-patient relationship in promoting these ends. Having explored in some detail the
Court's view of a desirable doctor-patient relationship and having
noted the Court's apparent willingness in recent cases to permit
some degree of state activity aimed at encouraging normal childbirth, we are now in a position to analyze the constitutionality of
a number of concrete approaches designed to ensure that the
contemplated doctor-patient relationship actually materializes.
In this Section we will examine clinic regulation and recordkeeping and reporting procedures as they relate to the consultation
process. In Section I11 we will turn to informed consent requirements, and in Section IV we will focus on counseling schemes.

A. Regulation of A bortion Clinics

A reality serving to undermine the emergence of meaningful
doctor-patient relationships is the fact that a t present at least
sixty percent of abortions occur in freestanding ~ l i n i c s . ' ~ W h i l e
some of these facilities are equipped not only to terminate pregnancy but also to provide needed counseling and other forms of
support,'" the general procedure allows the woman minimal contact with the physician performing the abortion. Typically, the
clinics are run by entrepreneurs and physicians on a profitmaking
basis."'7 Maximizing clinic revenue demands minimizing the
amount of time the doctor spends with each patient, thus treating strong disincentives for the development of meaningful
doctor-patient relationships. Even if time is allocated to careful
doctor-patient consultation, the financial incentives for the doctor are all on the side of encouraging the woman to go through
with the abortion. This is not to imply that medical judgment will
inevitably be distorted by concern to make one more fee. Still,
financial considerations are a powerful influence threatening to
bias the consulting physician in favor of the abortion decision and
against concern for fetal life.'" A doctor routinely performing
105. Sullivan, Tietze, & Dryfoos, supra note 13, at 127.
106. Burnhill, Humane Abortion Services: A Revolution in Human Rights and the
Ileliuery of a Medical Service, 42 MT. SINNJ. MED.,N.Y. 431, 436 (1975).
107. Id. a t 434-35. Rut cf. Schwartz, supra note 67, at 475 (arguing in an early article
that profit margins were likely to decline as clinics proliferated).
108. Numerous studies have noted the impact of differential financial rewards on
medical treatment decisions. See, e.g., Schneyer, supra note 70, at 136-41& nn.48-70 (and
authorities cited therein). Studies have also shown that there are a variety of contexts
where doctor specialization and the likelihood of a noncontiguous doctor-patient relationship tend to make the attitudes of colleagues more important than patient interest in
PROFESSIONAL
DOMINANCE:
THESOCIAL
shaping physician behavior. See E. FREIDSON,
STRUCTURE
OF MEDICAL
CARE199-206 (1970); Schneyer, supra note 70, at 137-38.
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abortions in a clinic is apt to become desensitized to the magnitude of the abortion choice in the life of an individual woman.log
Thus, even if such a doctor does take the time to counsel with his
patient, he is unlikely to play a role conducive to the protection
of fetal life in the woman's decisionmaking process.
Because of these considerations, some countries have enacted legislation either disallowing or strictly regulating the performance of abortions in freestanding clinic^."^ Under French
law, for example, a voluntary termination of pregnancy may be
performed only by a physician in a public hospital or in a private
hospital meeting certain statutory requirements."' If the number
of abortions performed in a private hospital exceeds one-quarter
of all surgical and obstetrical operations performed in any given
year, the hospital will be closed for one year. A repeat offense will
entail final closure of the establi~hrnent."~
Obviously, this type of statute precludes the emergence of
freestanding clinics operating as abortion mills. However, it is not
really clear that it solves the key problems associated with clinics.
Even in a private French hospital that observed the "onequarter" limitation, it would be quite possible that a relatively
small number of doctors would perform a high percentage of the
hospital's abortions. The problem of desensitization that is encountered in an abortion clinic would likely be replicated among
these doctors. Moreover, the financial incentives tending to create an institutional bias in favor of abortion do not arise solely in
the clinic setting. Because the great majority of abortions can be
performed using simple procedures and with relatively low overhead costs, it is likely that a hospital's abortion facilities will
operate in the black and may even provide funds to help support
research or other hospital programs. Subtle administrative pres109. But see Marcin & Marcin, The Physician's Decision-Making Role in Abortion
66,70-71 (describing experience of Dr. Bernard N .Nathanson, who was
Cases, 1975JURIST
influential in persuading the New York State Assembly to liberalize abortion laws in that
state and subsequently headed a major abortion clinic, but ultimately became convinced
that human life exists in the womb); Nathanson, Sounding Board: Deeper Into Abortion,
J. MED.1189 (1974).
291 New ENGLAND
110. See, e.g., The Criminal Law Consolidation Ordinance, 1876 to 1969, Ej 79A(3)(h)
(Austl., Northern Territory) (legal abortions must be performed in hospitals), reprinted
INTERNATIONAL
DIGESTOF HEALTH
LEGISLATION
428
in 28 WORLDHEALTHORGANIZATION,
(1977) [hereinafter cited as WHO INT'L DIGEST];Act of June 13, 1975, Law No. 50, Ej 3
(Nor.) (abortions after twelfth week permitted only in hospitals; earlier abortions may be
595 (1975).
performed in other approved institutions), translated in 26 WHO INT'L DIGEST
111. Act of Jan. 17,1975, Law No. 75-17, art. L. 162-2 (Fr.) (concerning the voluntary
termination of pregnancy), translated in 26 WHO INT'L DIGEST,supra note 110, at 352
( 1975).
112. Id. art. L. 178-1.

808

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I978

sures may result in the creation of a pro-abortion setting equivalent to the one a doctor is likely to experience in the clinic setting.
Despite these considerations, however, there is greater reason to
expect medical consultation that is sensitive to the value of potential life in a multipurpose medical institution than in a clinic
whose raison d'etre is the performance of abortions. Among other
things, a hospital staff is likely to have greater diversity of attitudes tgward abortion than the staff of an abortion clinic, and
collegial dynamics might help to reduce the predictable proabortion bias of the clinic setting.""
While interesting as an approach to limiting abortion procurement systems peculiarly likely to be insensitive to the value
of potential life, the French approach would have only limited
relevance to the contemporary American scene. Doe v. Bolton
expressly rejected a statutory requirement that all abortions, including first trimester abortions, be performed in licensed and
accredited hospital^.^'^ Moreover, Roe v. Wade and Doe u. Bolton
have been interpreted as placing severe limitations on appropriate regulation of abortion clinics. Thus, attempts by local governments to subject abortion clinics to restrictive zoning have been
declared unconstitutional.l~~imilarly,
blanket measures requiring that all abortions, including first trimester abortions, be performed in hospitals or equivalent facilities have been held uncons t i t ~ t i o n a l . ~ ~ W o uhave
r t s also taken a dim view of schemes imposing regulatory burdens on abortion facilities that are not
applicable to medical facilities in general.Il7 The most noteworthy case in this area is Friendship Medical Center, Ltd. v.
Chicago Board of Health.t1RIn that case, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals struck down regulations promulgated by the
Chicago Board of Health that required abortion clinics to keep
various types of records, conduct specified tests, maintain equipment necessary to treat abortion complications, and in general,
provide facilities that could render a high standard of abortion
care. Notwithstanding the fact the regulations were clearly
-

113. ('f. Schneyer, supra note 70, at 137-38 (noting the impact of organizational
dynamics and collegial pressure in biasing medical treatment decisions).
114. 410 U.S. 179, 193-95 (1973).
115. Planned Parenthood v. Citizens for Community Action, 558 F.2d 861 (8th Cir.
1977); Framingham Clinic, Inc. v. Board of Selectmen, -M a s s . , 367 N.E.2d 606
(1977).
116. Arnold v. Sendak, 416 F. Supp. 22 (S.D. Ind.), aff 'd, 429 U.S. 968 (1976).
117; See, e.g., Word v. Poelker, 495 F.2d 1349 (8th Cir. 1974); Mobile Women's
Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Board of Comm'rs, 426 F. Supp. 331 (S.D. Ala. 1977); Hallmark
Clinic v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 380 F. Supp. 1153 (E.D.N.C. 1974).
118. 505 F.2d 1141 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975).
119. See id. at '1144-45.

7831

ABORTION COUNSELING

809

designed to protect maternal health, the court held that they
were unconstitutional because the state did not have a compelling interest in promoting maternal health until the end of the
first trimester. lZo
The result in Friendship Medical Center may be criticized on
several grounds. Most obviously, even though first trimester abortions are relatively safe, they will clearly be even safer if performed in facilities equipped to handle foreseeable complications.
As long as the regulations do not interfere with the right of the
woman and her doctor to make and implement an informed abortion decision, such regulations should be allowed. This conclusion
draws added support from subsequent Supreme Court case law
suggesting that a state interest need not be compelling in order
to justify state action that does not unduly burden the abortion
decision. In the Friendship Medical Center case, the Seventh
Circuit assumed that the mere presence of the woman's fundamental privacy right was sufficient to require a compelling state
interest test in the area of clinic regulation.I2l The Supreme
Court's subsequent decision in Maher u. Roe,lZ2however, has
made it clear that legislation designed to foster legitimate state
interests is not constitutionally objectionable where it does not
create "unduly burdensome interference with [the woman's]
freedom to decide."lZ3Thus, i t would now appear that the state
need not meet the compelling state interest test to justify regulations-even regulations t h a t add a n overlay of requirements
applicable only to abortion facilities124-unless the regulations
constitute an excessive restriction of female autonomy.
Of course, the tougher compelling state interest analysis is
triggered by a relatively slight burden on a woman's autonomy.
In Carey u. Population Services International, I 2 l a statute permitting only licensed pharmacists to distribute nonprescription contraceptives was held unduly burdensome because i t
"substantially limit[ed] access to the means of effectuating"
-

- - - -

120. Id. at 1150.
121. See id.
122. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
123. Id. at 474.
124. The "differential regulatory overlay" argument derives much, if not all, of its
force from the assumption that any differential treatment in the abortion area can only
he justified by a compelling state interest. See generally Friendship Medical Center, Ltd.
v. Chicago Bd. of Health, 505 F.2d 1141, 1152-53 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
997 (1975). Justice Powell's conclusion in Maher that a state scheme that funded therapeutic but not nontherapeutic abortions could be sustained "under the less demanding
test of rationality," 432 U.S. at 478, undercuts this assumption.
125. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
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reproductive ~ h 0 i c e s .Therefore,
l~~
to the extent clinic regulations
have the effect of significantly curtailing the availability of abortion facilities, such regulations will be subject to the compelling
state interest analysis applied by the Seventh Circuit in
Friendship Medical Center. But where their effect is merely to
establish a minimum threshold for the quality of abortion facilities, regulations rationally related to maternal health should be
permissible.
A number of states have passed legislation requiring that
abortions after the first trimester be performed in hospitals.In
The Court in Doe v. Bolton alluded to the possibility that after
the first trimester the state might "adopt standards for licensing
all facilities where abortions may be performed so long as those
standards are legitimately related to the objective the state seeks
to accomplish."128The Court indicated that the state would be
required to make a fairly strong showing that the standards were
necessitated by medical considerations if such regulations were to
be justified on the basis of the state's compelling interest in maternal health.IzgThe dicta in Doe v. Bolton militate against the
constitutionality of a statutory provision precluding clinics with
sophisticated medical technology from performing second trimester abortions. Nonetheless, a plausible argument can be made
that the added medical risks inherent in abortions during the
later states of pregnancy, together with the Supreme Court's concern for a sensitive doctor-patient relationship, would constitutionally validate a statute requiring that abortions be performed
in hospitals after the first trimester.

B. Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements
The permissibility of limited recordkeeping and reporting
requirements is one of the few clear exceptions to the constitutional prohibition against regulation of first trimester abortions.
The Supreme Court sustained such requirements in Planned Parenthood v. Dunforth,'" but made it clear that the exception was
a narrow one. Recordkeeping and reporting requirements during
the first trimester were characterized as "perhaps approaching
-

-

126. Id. at 688.
127. See, e.g., IDAHO
CODE4 18-608(2) (Supp. 1978); Illinois Abortion Law of 1975, 8
4, ILL.ANN. STAT.ch. 38, 8 81-24 (Smith-Hurd 1977); IND.CODEANN. # 35-1-58.5-2(b)(2)
(Burns 1975); KY. REV.STAT.4 311.760(2) (1977); MINN.STAT.ANN.4 145.412(2) (West
Supp. 1979); Mom. REV.CODESANN. 4 94-5-618(b) (1977).
128. 410 U.S. 179, 194-95 (1973).
129. Id. at 195.
130. 428 U.S.52, 79-81 (1976).
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impermissible limits."131The Court warned against efforts to exploit the exception by indirectly imposing, "through the sheer
burden of recordkeeping detail,"132constraints that the Court had
previously held to be unconstitutional. Significantly, as in Maher
a year later, the ultimate issue was perceived to be whether the
requirements in question constituted an "unduly burdensome
interferen~e"'~"ith the woman's abortion decision. The Court
further limited its holding by stressing that the Missouri statute
provided that the information gathered "shall be confidential and
shall be used only for statistical purposes."I" Finally, the Court
noted the importance of a rational relationship between the information requested and a legitimate state interest.
In Danforth, the Court rationalized its acceptance of Missouri's recordkeeping requirements by recognizing the state's
valid interest in maternal health.13Vecause Roe v . Wade had
held that this interest did not become compelling until the second
trimester, and because Danforth sanctioned first trimester recordkeeping requirements, one commentator has discerned in
Danforth signs of a "circumspect retreat" from the no-regulation
stance of Roe.'" However, in light of the Court's subsequent assertion in Maher that validation of some measures affecting first
.trimester abortion choices "signals no retreat from Roe,"IS7 it
seems more accurate to state that Roe was not as rigidly antiregulation as initially supposed. In any event, it is clear the state has
"strong and legitimate"13Rinterests in protecting female autonomy and potential life as well as maternal health. All these interests can be furthered by reasonable recordkeeping and reporting
requirements.
In the long run, such requirements should yield significant
data facilitating medical judgments, thereby contributing to
maternal health.'3g However, the immediate impact of recordkeeping and reporting requirements is to require a minimal level
of interaction between the doctor and the patient. This increases
the woman's autonomy by expanding the informational base
upon which the abortion decision ultimately rests and may well
alert the woman to facts that would lead her to continue her
131. Id. at 81.
Id.
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977).
428 U.S. at 79, 87.
Id. at 80-81.
1976 B.Y.U. L. REV.977, 997.
432 U.S. at 473-75.
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 478; Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. at 446.
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 79-81.
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pregnancy. Because several legitimate state interests support
recordkeeping requirements,140 there appears to be no reason
why informational requests could not be tailored to further
other of these interests in addition to the interest in maternal
health. Thus, Danforth should not be read as holding that recordkeeping and reporting procedures are permissible only if they are
rationally related to the state's maternal health interests.
As noted, the immediate effect of recordkeeping requirements is to reinforce one of the major features of the Supreme
Court's view of the doctor-patient relationship: the screening
function.'" Essentially, recordkeeping requirements promote the
interests in female autonomy and fetal life by insisting that a
thorough patient history be obtained. That such requirements
should turn out to be constitutional is not surprising, considering
the Supreme Court's insistence in all its major abortion cases on
doctor involvement in the abortion decision. Because the taking
of a medical history is an important aspect of the doctor-patient
relationship mandated by the Court, and because no incremental
invasion of the woman's privacy occurs if the doctor is simply
required to report some of the data gleaned in the process, no
constitutional infraction occurs so long as confidentiality is adequately safeguarded.
As more states pass recordkeeping and reporting requirements, difficult line-drawing problems are bound to arise in determining (1)whether the confidentiality of the data gathered is
sufficiently protected, (2) whether the information requested is
unnecessarily intrusive, and (3) whether the requirements taken
as a whole are overly burdensome. In order to analyze these issues, it is useful to consider in detail the types of requirements
and informational requests apt to be encountered. In this regard,
it will be useful to refer occasionally to a recently enacted Louisiana statuteld2that, because of its comprehensiveness,raises most
of the issues likely to arise.
140. Such alternative interests are not limited to those noted in the text. In Whalen
v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), the Supreme Court sustained a recordkeeping and reporting

scheme pursuant to which all those distributing or obtaining dangerous drugs by prescription, as well as those prescribing such drugs, were reported to the state health department.
The Court held that, in view of excellent confidentiality precautions, the privacy rights
of those challenging the statute were not violated and the overall scheme was constitutional, since it was rationally related to the state's legitimate interest in regulating traffk
in dangerous drugs.
141. See notes 48-57 and accompanying text supra.
142. Act of July 10, 1978, Act No. 435, sec. 1, 44 1299.35.1-.18, 1978 La. Sess. Law
Serv. 836 (West)(to be codified as LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. 4 4 40:1299.35.1-.18 (West)).
A. An individual abortion report for each abortion performed or induced

ABORTION COUNSELING

7831

1.

813

Confidentiality

The Louisiana statute deals with the confidentiality issue by
requiring that the report "shall be confidential and shall not contain the name of the woman."143However, the patient is assigned
a number which is included in the report,ld4and a copy of the
abortion report is ultimately made a part of the medical record
of the patient a t the facility or hospital in which the abortion was
performed. 14"
One of the primary objections to a reporting requirement
that does not adequately safeguard confidentiality is that the
patient may be deterred from seeking an abortion if she fears
other people may hear about the abortion. Thus, at least one
court has invalidated recording and reporting provisions that
-

-

upon a woman shall be completed by her attending physician. The report shall
he confidential and shall not contain the name of the woman. This report shall
include: (1)Patient number, (2)Name and address of the abortion facility or
hospital, (3)Date of abortion, (4) Zip code or residence of pregnant woman, (5)
Age of pregnant woman, (6) Race, (7)Marital status, (8)Number of previous
pregnancies, (9)Educational background, (10)Number of living children, (11)
Number of previous induced abortions, (12)Date of last induced abortion, (13)
Date of last live birth, (14)Method of contraception a t time of conception, (15)
Date of beginning of last menstrual period, (16)Medical condition of woman at
time of abortion, (17)Rh type of pregnant woman, (18)Type of abortion procedure, (19)Complications by type, (20)Type of procedure done after the abortion, (21)Type of family planning recommended, (22)Type of additional counseling given, (23)Signature of attending physician, (24)The certifications provided for in this Chapter.
B. An individual complication report for any post-abortion care performed
upon a woman shall be completed by the physician providing such post-abortion
care. The report shall include: (1)The date of the abortion. (2)The name and
address of the abortion facility or hospital where the abortion was performed.
(3)The nature of the abortion complication diagnosed or treated.
C. All abortion reports shall be signed by the attending physician and
submitted to the Department of Health and Human Resources within thirty
days after the date of the abortion. All complication reports shall be signed by
the physician providing the post-abortion care and submitted to the Department of Health and Human Resources within thirty days after the date of the
completion of the post-abortion care.
D. A copy of the abortion report shall be made a part of the medical record
of the patient of the facility or hospital in which the abortion was performed.
E. The Department of Health and Human Resources shall be responsible
for collecting all abortion reports and complication reports and collating and
evaluating all data gathered therefrom and shall annually publish a statistical
report based on such data from abortions performed in the previous calendar
year.
Id. Ei 1299.35.10.
143. Id. 8 1299.35.10(A).
144. Id. 4 1299.35.1O(A)(l).
145. Id. 8 1299.35.10(D).
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called for the identification of the woman by name.lJ6At the same
time, an important benefit of reporting requirements is the information such reports could yield about risks to maternal health as
a result of repeat abortions. If the information is gathered in a
way that preserves the complete anonymity of the woman, longitudinal studies that would identify repeat abortion situations
would be impossible.
The Louisiana approach to this dilemma is somewhat of a
compromise. The woman's name does not appear on the report,
but a patient number is assigned that makes it possible to identify repeat abortions if a second abortion is performed in the same
institution. A problem with the Louisiana approach is that no
provision is made for statewide standardization of patient numbers, thereby preventing meaningful longitudinal studies based
on these reports. The legislature was no doubt reluctant to assign
women universal abortion numbers permanently linked to their
names or social security numbers because of the Orwellian aura
of such a procedure and because it might ultimately make easier
the disclosure of the name behind the number.
2. Intrusiveness

Much of the information requested under the Louisiana statute is unexceptionable from the perspective of relative intrusiveness. Patient number, age, name of facility where abortion is
performed, date of abortion, and the zip code of the pregnant
are noncontroversial matters that would be expected to
be included in virtually any recordkeeping procedure.
Other noncontroversial information that can reasonably be
requested is information having a clear bearing on the medical
advisability of abortion in the woman's situation, information
that would indicate special medical techniques that might need
to be applied, or information that would record medical compliAs a general rule,
cations involved in a particular ab0rti0n.l~~
information that would normally be requested in the course of
obtaining a woman's medical history should be subject to reasonable reporting requirements. The request for this information involves no invasion of the woman's privacy beyond that which
146. Schulman v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 234, 240, 255-56,
342 N.E.2d 501, 504, 513-14, 379 N.Y.S.2d 702, 706, 718-19 (1975).
147. Nondisclosure of exact address information may of course be significant to preserving confidentiality.
148. See, e.g., Act of July 10, 1978, Act No. 435, sec. 1, 8 1299.35.10(A)(8),( l l ) , (13),
ANN. 4
(15), (20), 1978 La. Sess. Law Serv. 836 (West)(to be codified as LA. REV.STAT.
40: l299.35.lO(A)(8),( l l ) , (13), (15), (2O)(West))(quoted in note 142 supra).
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would be necessary in any event were she to obtain an abortion.
These reporting requirements do not in any way operate to dictate the outcome of the abortion decision in a particular case.
Other more controversial information relates to the social
and educational background of the woman.14g
Arguably, information of this nature is less relevant to the exercise of a doctor's
medical judgment. Data such as race, marital status, and number
of living children are less directly related to the exercise of a
physician's judgment than the number of previous pregnancies,
the number of previous abortions, date of the last menstrual period, and the like. A woman's background, however, and the circumstances under which she lives may have a significant bearing
on the potential impact of the abortion choice on her mental
health.'" Thus, a sensitive physician will be concerned about the
woman's background and environment in order to better assess
the wisdom of abortion in her particular circumstances and in
order to better asses the types of followup assistance or support
she may need. This information would also be useful in statistical
studies aimed a t identifying the demographic characteristics of
women seeking abortions. Although the potential for excessive
reporting requirements may be of some concern, such requirements should be permissible as long as the information requested
is relevant to the doctor's exercise of sensitive and informed judgment about the wisdom of an abortion in light of the totality of
the woman's circumstances.
A final category of information relates to the method of contraception, if any, at the time of conception and the type of family
planning recommended subsequent to an abortion.lJ1This type of
reporting requirement appears to be aimed primarily at minimizing the number of repeat abortions. Assuming that contraception
is less risky than abortion, ensuring that a woman has adequate
information about available contraceptives is obviously related to
a legitimate interest in her long-range health.
Although it is not immediately clear how contraception information bears on the abortion actually being performed, such information may be useful in determining the extent to which the
availability of abortion impacts on the use of contraceptives. So
long as such information imposes no constraints on the ultimate
decision reached by the woman and her consulting physician, a
149. See, e.g., id. Ej lB9.35.lO(A)(6),(7), (9), (10).
1.50. See notes 240, 264-66 and accompanying text infra.
151. See, e.g., Act of July 10, 1978, Act No. 435, sec. 1, f 1299.35.10(A) (14), (21),
1978 La. Sess. Law Serv. 836 (West)(to be codified as h.REV. STAT.ANN. $
40: 1299.35.lO(A)(l4),(21)(West)) (quoted in note 142 supra).
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reporting procedure that helps identify the need for contraception
procedures that could possibly avoid repeat abortions would seem
to be permissible.
3. Burdensomeness

There is no easy way to assess whether specific reporting and
recordkeeping legislation is overly burdensome. No readily identifiable standard is available on the basis of which one may discriminate between legislation demanding too much and legislation imposing only a reasonable burden. The Danforth decision
itself provides little guidance. The statute involved in Danforth
calledfor the preparation of reporting forms by the Missouri Division of Health, but because the Court gave no indication of what
was on such forms (presumably because the constitutionality of
the statute was challenged before the forms were prepared), there
is no way to gauge the burdensomeness of the reporting requirements approved in Danforth. While certain factors bearing on the
burdensomeness issue come to mind-the length of the report
required, the extent to which the reporting procedures call for
information beyond a normal medical history, the likelihood that
the burden of preparing the report itself would bias a doctor's
judgment as to the appropriateness of an abortion-the burdensomeness issue is one that must ultimately be decided on a caseby-case basis. The Louisiana statute is quite rigorous in its reporting requirements, but arguably is not overly burdensome.
It is still too early to predict with precision how extensive a
recordkeeping and reporting requirement is permissible under
Danforth. However, the allowance of the reporting requirement in
Danforth is additional evidence of the Supreme Court's concern
for the existence of a meaningful doctor-patient relationship in
the abortion context. Hopefully, the information Danforth allows
to be gathered will be put to meaningful use. As indicated earlier,
there is language in Danforth praising the Missouri statute on the
ground that the data gathered would be used "only for statistical
This "statistical purpose" restriction should be construed broadly to allow meaningful analysis of the data gathered
so that medical knowledge may be advanced and society placed
in a better position to grapple with the problem of abortion.
One of the more interesting statutory recordkeeping provisions in Europe is one that has been adopted in Czechoslovakia.
Not only does Czechoslovakian law require the collection of sta152. 428 U.S. at 79, 81.

7831

ABORTION COUNSELING

817

tistical abortion data, the law also demands that district and
regional abortion commissions use the data in analyzing on an
annual basis the factors that cause women to seek abortions. It
is hoped the reports will place various governmental agencies in
a better position to take practical steps toward eliminating a t
least some of the factors leading women to seek abortions.lS A
statutory provision of this nature would appear to be wholly consistent with both Roe and Danforth and would help to heighten
sensitivity to the value of unborn life. A recordkeeping and reporting procedure akin to the Czechoslovakian statute would thus
provide another avenue for improving, within the constitutional
framework delineated by the Supreme Court, both the meaningfulness of doctor-patient interaction and the sensitivity of the
abortion decisionmaking process to the interest in fetal life.

A. Types of Informed Consent Provisions
For the most part, Planned Parenthood v. D ~ n f o r t hwill
' ~ ~be
remembered as a decision that narrowed the range of permissible
state intervention in the abortion decision. The Court's acceptance of recordkeeping and reporting procedures is like a quiet
backwater in a more dominant current, paralleled in direction
only by its decision to sustain Missouri's informed consent statute. But reverse currents should not be ignored. The recognition
by the Danforth Court of the appropriateness of informed consent
requirements is particularly significant.
Statutes and case law requiring a woman's consent prior to
the performance of an abortion constitute an important regulation of the doctor-patient relationship and one clearly aimed a t
protecting the woman's autonomy. Several states have passed
informed consent legislation,l" and the conventional common law
notion that consent is a prerequisite to nonliability for battery
would presumably apply el~ewhere.~~Vocusing
on informed consent statutes, considerable variation is discernible among state
153. Order of May 16, 1973, No. 71, 13 (Czech.), translated i n 25 WHOINT'LDIGEST,
supra note 110, at 75 (1974).
154. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
155. IDAHO
CODE$8 18-608 to -609 (Supp. 1978); Illinois Abortion Law of 1975, ILL.
ANN. STAT.ch. 38, § 81-23(2) (Smith-Hurd 1977); KY.REV. STAT.$6 311.730, .740 (1977);
MASS.GEN.LAWSANN.ch. 112, § 12Q (West Supp. 1978-1979);MINN.STAT.ANN. § 145.412
(West Supp. 1978); Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 188.020 (Vernon Supp. 1978); MONT.REV.CODES
ANN. § # 94-5-615 to -616 (1977); N.D. CENT.CODE§ § 14-02.1-02 to -03 (Supp. 1977); 35
PA.CONS.STAT.ANN.$8 6602-6603 (Purdon 1977); UTAHCODEANN. § 76-7-305 (1978).
HANDBOOK
OF THE LAWOF TORTS$ 18 (4th ed. 1971).
156. See W. PROSSER,
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provisions. Some demand only a general expression of consent,
while others specify in detail what information a woman must be
given before she can effectively give her informed consent.
General informed consent provisions are well illustrated by
the Missouri provision sustained in Danforth. That provision requires that prior to submitting to an abortion a woman must
certify in writing that she consents to it and that her consent is
informed, freely given, and not the result of coercion.Iw Many
states have enacted only the barest of consent requirements,
doing little if anything beyond codifying common law rules.1wAt
this end of the continuum, regulation of the doctor-patient relationship diminishes to the vanishing point and the statutes
merely operate to protect a woman from undergoing an abortion
against her will.
More detailed informed consent provisions tend to resemble
the statute adopted in Utah. Under its provisions, consent must
be given in writing, and no consent is considered voluntary and
informed unless the attending physician has informed the prospective abortion patient of a variety of matters that could bear
upon her decision. Specifically, the woman must be given the
names and addresses of two Utah adoption agencies, told of the
availability of their services, and informed of the possibility of
nonagency adoption. She must be apprised of the details of development of unborn children. The particulars of the abortion procedure and the nature of postoperative recovery must be described
to her, along with any foreseeable complications and risks. Further, the doctor must discuss with her any additional factors that
he or she deems relevant to the woman's informed consent.I5#
Other detailed informed consent provisions vary slightly in
the types of information required to be given. Most detailed provisions require that the woman be informed concerning fetal development, the nature of the procedure and possible complications, and alternatives to abortion. The most detailed informed
consent statute adopted to date is a recently enacted Louisiana
-

-

-

p

p

p

157. Mo. ANN.STAT.8 188.020 (Vernon Supp. 1978). Massachusetts also has a general
statute of this type. MASSGEN.LAWSANN. ch. 112, 8 126 (West Supp. 1978-1979).
158. ARK. STAT.ANN. § 41-2555 (1977); IND. CODEANN. 8 35-1-58.5-2(Bums 1975);
LAW
IOWA
CODEANN. § 707.8 (West 1978); NEV.REV. STAT.8 442.250 (1977);N.Y. PENAL
4 125.05 (McKinney 1975); OR. Rev. STAT.8 435.435 (1977); S.C. CODE§ 44-41-20 (1977);
S.D. COMPILED
LAWSANN.8 34-23A-7 (1977);W N . CODE
ANN. 39-301 (1975); VA. CODE
4 18.2-76 (1975);WASH.REV. CODE8 9.02.070 (1977).
159. UTAHCODEANN. 8 76-7-305 (1978). The Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Minnesota,
Montana, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania statutes also give some description of what
constitutes informed consent or mandate some counseling. See note 155 supra.
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provision.160It requires the doctor to tell the woman that she is
pregnant, indicate how many weeks her pregnancy has progressed, inform her that "the unborn child is a human life from the
moment of conception," and describe "the anatomical and physiological characteristics of the particular unborn child." The
doctor must also inform the woman that the "unborn child may
be viable" if it is more than twenty-two weeks in gestation and
that abortion can result in serious complications that are spelled
out in the statute. Finally, the woman must be'told about public
and private agencies from which she can receive family planning
information and from which she may obtain assistance during
pregnancy and after birth if she decides not to have an abortion.lsl
The emergence of informed consent statutes in the abortion
area is part of a broader development in tort law. Modem informed consent law as it has emerged over the past twenty yearsls2
is a synthesis of battery notions of consent and negligence concepts of reasonable disclosure.lmThe area is complex and, to be
T o rpurposes, however, a few
candid, somewhat of a m o r a s ~ . ~ ~ our
general comments will suffice. Behind questions about how much
information a doctor must give his patient to avoid malpractice
liability lie much deeper concerns over state and doctor paternalism, as well as protection of the woman's autonomy.ls5 As one
contrasts the general and specific informed consent statutes, for
example, it seems evident that the reason for the more detailed
disclosure requirements in the latter is to provide stronger assurances that the patient will receive the information needed for an
autonomous decision. The general statutes leave more room for
160. Act of July 10, 1978, Act No. 435, sec. 1, § 1299.35.6, 1978 La. Sess. Law Serv.
836 (West) (to be codified as LA. REV.STAT.ANN. § 40:1299.35.6 (West)).
161. Id.
162. Contemporary informed consent law is often traced to two sources: Salgo v.
Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1975), and
McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability for Unauthorized Medical Treatment, 41 MINN.L.
REV.381, 392 (1957). See, e.g., Plante, An Analysis of Informed Consent, 36 FORDHAM
L.
REV. 639, 651 (1968); Abortion Alternative, supra note 79, a t 175 n.54.
163. Katz, supra note 62, at 143; Abortion Alternative, supra note 79, a t 175.
164. An extensive body of literature dealing with this issue has been produced. See,
e.g., Hagman, The Medical Patient's Right to Know: Report on a Medical-Legal-Ethical,
Empirical Study, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV.758 (1970); Katz, supra note 62; Plante, supra note
162; Schneyer, supra note 70; Seidelson, supra note 62; Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed
Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 628 (1970); Note, Who's Afraid of Informed
L.
Consent? An Affirmative Approach to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 44 BROOKLYN
REV.241, 259 (1978); Note, Advice and Consent in Medicine: A Look at the Doctrine of
Informed Consent, 16 N.Y.L.F. 863 (1970); Note, Failure to Inform as Medical
Malpractice, 23 VAND.L. REV.754 (1970); Abortion Alternative, supra note 79.
165. For an excellent discussion of informed consent law in terms of the tension
between doctor paternalism and patient autonomy, see Katz, supra note 62.
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doctor paternalism by giving the doctor more leeway to decide
whether or not the patient needs particular information. At the
same time, it seems clear that the more specific statutes involve
a heavier dose of state paternalism. Detailed statutes reflect a
legislative judgment that the doctor and patient are not capable
of resolving on their own the extent to which disclosure occurs or
decisionmaking is left with the doctor. One is reminded of Rousseau's remark about being "forced to be free."166The state adopts
a paternalistic posture toward the doctor-patient relationship in
order to protect the woman's autonomy from doctor paternalism.
Whatever the paradoxes in this situation, there is no doubt
that the theory behind the emerging pattern of informed consent
statutes is to assure the patient greater autonomy in the making
of treatment decisions. As a practical matter, doctor paternalism
poses a greater threat to patient autonomy than state paternalism
in this context, since the state merely mandates disclosure,
whereas a variety of influences predispose doctors toward minimizing the time they spend educating patients.lm Thus, doctor
paternalism is much more likely to remain invisible until it is too
late for effective exercise of patient autonomy. Moreover, the
realities of the abortion situation tend to promote reticence on the
part of the woman and close off normal channels of communication and support, so that the woman's decision is all too often
made hurriedly without full consideration of its ramification^.'^^
Part of what is going on in the informed consent area reflects
a practical concern to circumvent the "conspiracy of doctor silence" in order to make it easier for malpractice cases to get to
the jury."' Moreoyer, there is abundant evidence that informed
consent provisions seldom lead to as much patient autonomy in
practice as the underlying theory would suggest.170 All that is
important for our purposes, however, is that informed consent
statutes, even if only minimally effective in attaining their theoretical ends, are at least conducive to expanding in some degree
the autonomy of a woman faced with an abortion decision. If the
166. J. ROUSSEAU,
THESOCIAL
CONTRACT
18 (G. Cole trans. 1950).
167. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 62, at 148 (speaking of strong doctor beliefs that
patients are not intellectually or emotionally equipped to make difficult treatment decisions and of the "deeply ingrained Hippocratic tradition against disclosure"). See
generally Schneyer, supra note 70.
168. See Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554, 587 (E.D. Pa.
1975) (Adams, J., concurring and dissenting), aff'd sub nom. Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 428
U.S. 901 (1976).
& F. INBAU,
MEDICAL
JURISPRUDENCE
75 (1971); Schneyer, supra
169. See, e.g., J. WALT
note 70, at 155 & n.135; Abortion Alternative, supra note 79, at 179.
170. See Katz, supra note 62, at 164-74.
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autonomy of the woman is the primary value behind her privacy
right, it is difficult to see how informed consent statutes, which
increase her autonomy, can be deemed to intrude on a woman's
privacy right.

B. Constitutionality of Informed Consent Provisions
Although not explicit in the Court's analysis in Danforth, the
foregoing reasoning is reflected in its result. The appellants in
Danforth challenged Missouri's general informed consent provision on the grounds that it imposed an impermissible extra layer
of regulation on the abortion decision in violation of earlier abortion decisions,171and was vague and 0verbr0ad.l~~
The Supreme
Court, in upholding the consent provision, reasoned that the decision to have an abortion "is an important, and often a stressful
one, and it is desirable and imperative that it be made with full
knowledge of its nature and consequence^."^^^ Justice Stewart
underscored the permissibility of informed consent statutes in his
concurring opinion by stressing that the Court's holding in Roe
v. Wade "was not intended to preclude the State from enacting
a provision aimed at ensuring that the abortion decision is made
in a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary fashion."17' The Court
dispensed with the vagueness argument in a footnote, holding
that the arguably vague term "informed" simply meant "the giving of information to the patient as to just what would be done
and as to its consequence^."^^^ To give the term a more extensive
meaning, the Court indicated, might "confine the attending physician in an undesired and uncomfortable straitjacket in the practice of his profession."176
Because Danforth involved a very general informed consent
statute, the precise scope of its holding with regard to more detailed and arguably more intrusive consent requirements remains
somewhat unclear. For the most part, the more detailed informed
consent statutes reviewed since Danforth have withstood judicial
l ~ ~Eighth Circuit sustained a
scrutiny. In Hodgson v. L a w ~ o n the
Minnesota statute that made it "unlawful to perform an abortion
without first obtaining the consent of the woman . . . after a full
-

-

428 U.S. at 65-66 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,164-65 (1973); Doe v. Bolton,
179, 195-200 (1973)).
Id. at 66.
Id. at 67.
Id. at 90 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Id. at 67 n.8.

Id.
542 F.2d 1350 (8th Cir. 1976).

822

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I978

explanation of the abortion procedure and its effect."'7nSimilarly,
in Wolfe u. Schroering,17' the Sixth Circuit upheld a Kentucky
informed consent provision that requires physicians to "inform
the expectant mother of the reasonably possible physical and
mental consequences of the performance of the abortion or the
nonperformance of the abortion."lROStill more specific was the
Pennsylvania statute sustained by a three-judge court in Planned
Parenthood Association u. Fitzpatrick. lB1That provision requires
informed consent except where abortion is immediately necessary
to save the life of the mother, and defines "informed consent" as
a written statement, voluntarily entered into by the person upon
whom an abortion is to be performed, whereby she specifically
consents thereto. Such consent shall be deemed to be an informed consent only if it affirmatively appears in the written
statement signed by the person upon whom the abortion is to
be performed that she has been advised (i) that there may be
detrimental physical and psychological effects which are not
forseeable [sic], (ii) of possible alternatives to abortion, including childbirth and adoption, and (iii) of the medical procedures
to be used. Such statement shall be signed by the physician or
by a counselor authorized by him and shall also be made orally
in readily understandable terms insofar as practi~able.'~~

Significantly, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed Fitzpatrick,lMciting Danforth. The Court's statements in other contexts regarding the binding character of summary affirmances
have been less than a model of consistency,lR4but in light of
dictum in Hicks v. MirandalR5that such affirmances constitute
adjudication on the merits, the Court's affirmance of Fitzpatrick
would appear to control lower court adjudication in this area
unless and until the Court revises its position-at least with regard to informed consent statutes no more detailed than Pennsylvania's.
The only post-Danforth case to invalidate an informed consent statute is Wynn v. Scott. lR6In that case, a three-judge court
178. Id. at 1355-56 (quoting MINN.STAT.ANN.8 145.412(1)(4)(West Supp. 1978)).
179. 541 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1976).
180. Id. at 526 (quoting KY. REV. STAT.5 311.730 (1977)).
181. 401 F. Supp. 554, 583 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd sub nom. Franklin v. Fitzpatrick,
428 U.S. 901 (1976).
182. 35 PA. CONS.STAT.ANN. § 6602 (Purdon 1977).
183. Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 428 U.S. 901 (1976).
SUPREME
COURT
PRACTICE
321-25 (5th
184. See generally R. STERN& E. GRESSMAN,
ed. 1978).
185. 422 U.S. 332, 343-45 (1975). See also Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U S . 173 (1977).
186. 449 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Ill. 1978). An appeal from the decision in Wynn was
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sustained those portions of an Illinois statute modeled on the
provision sustained in Danforth. However, the court struck down
two further provisions that specified that no consent would be
informed unless the woman was instructed regarding
(a) The physical competency of the fetus at the time the abortion is to be performed, such as, but not limited to, what the
fetus looks like, the fetus' ability to move, swallow, and its physical characteristics; (b) The general dangers of abortion, including, but not limited to, the possibility of subsequent sterility,
premature birth, liveborn fetus and other dangers . . . .1x7
Conscious of the Supreme Court's affirmance of Fitzpatrick, the
court avoided premising its conclusion on an analysis of the impact of these provisions on the doctor-patient decisionmaking
process. Instead, the court reasoned that the provisions were
objectionable because they were "both overly vague and overly
specific."la They were overly vague because the descriptions of
specific facts the woman must be told were prefaced with the
phrases "such as, but not limited to" and "including, but not
limited to." Thus doctors were purportedly not given "fair warning of what is required."18@On the other hand, the provisions were
supposedly too specific in that the physician was required to inform the woman of dangers that might not be applicable in her
situation (e.g., the possibility of live birth in the case of a woman
seeking a first trimester abortion) .Ig0
While these arguments have some force and indicate a need
for careful drafting, differentiating the provisions in Wynn from
those sustained in Fitzpatrick on the basis of vagueness or overspecificity is difficult. If anything, the Wynn statute is less vague
because its drafters included specific instances of the types of
information required, whereas the Fitzpatrick statute merely provides a general description of such information.lglThe overspeciffiled with the Supreme Court but dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Carey v. Wynn, 99 S.
Ct. 49 (1978). The dismissal did not go to the merits and merely indicated that the appeal
from the declaratory judgment issued by the three-judge court in Wynn should have been
to the court of appeals. Id. a t 50.
187. Illinois Abortion Law of 1975, Q 3(2)(a), (b), ILL. ANN. STAT.ch. 38, 81-23(a),
(b) (Smith-Hurd 1977).
188. 449 F. Supp. at 1317.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. The authors of the Model Penal Code pursued a similar gambit in trying to
circumvent void-for-vagueness problems in drafting their loitering statute. See MODEL
PENAL
CODE8 250.6 (Proposed Final Draft, 1962). Cf. People v. Berck, 32 N.Y.2d 567, 300
N.E.2d 411, 347 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1973) (holding statute with general description of loitering
PENAL
void for vagueness, but intimating that a statute following the approach of MODEL
CODE8 250.6 would be constitutional).
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icity problem is also exaggerated. As the Fitzpatrick court noted,
if some of the information the doctor is required to give the
woman is inapplicable in the particular case, nothing prevents
the doctor from telling her so after complying with the statute.lg2
The *Wynncourt's response appears to belg3that it was precisely
this type of contradictory verbal gymnastics that Justice Blackmun intended to rule out when he warned in Danforth against
informed consent statutes that "confine the attending physician
in an undesired and uncomfortable straitjacket."lg4 While this
argument is not without plausibility, it would make better sense
to construe the straitjacket metaphor more loosely to comport
with Maher's emphasis on "unduly burdensome interference"
with the abortion decisionmaking process.lg5Informed consent
provisions that call for an occasional qualifying remark or equivalent adaptation would not be objectionable under this analysis.
Only provisions that are so detailed, unrealistic, or distorted that
they impede rather than facilitate meaningful doctor-patient interaction would be prohibited. Inasmuch as the effect of informed
consent is generally to expand the woman's autonomy, states
should be granted wide latitude in framing such provisions. Consent requirements that are not drafted so as to dictate medical
judgment or foreclose treatment options should be allowed.
Justice Blackmun's straitjacket metaphor and the concomitant definition of "informed consent" as merely "the giving of
information to the patient as to just what would be done and as
to its consequence^"^^^ could be taken to support only the constitutionality of "general" consent provisions. But such an interpretation would be exceedingly insensitive to the informational
needs of a woman faced with an abortion decision. A narrow
reading of Justice Blackmun's definition would limit the doctor's
responsibility to informing the patient of the selected abortion
method and of the fact that as a result of this procedure she would
no longer be pregnant. Such a reading would ignore a woman's
frequent need for much more detailed information about the nature of the procedure, its risks, and alternatives.lY7Moreover,
general provisions do very little to protect the woman from the
possible bias of her physician. If the doctor is strongly proabortion, or has a financial interest in the potential abortion, he
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

401 F. Supp. at 587-88.
See 449 F. Supp. at 1316-17.
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 n.8 (1976).
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977).
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 n.8 (1976).
See notes 58-64 and accompanying text supra.
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or she may too easily conclude that the decision is not a critical
one to the woman and that she needs very limited information
before making the decision. log
Finally, general statutes may ignore the woman's need for
information about the facts of fetal development. If the doctor is
not specifically required to provide this information, he may be
able to meet his statutory obligation by describing the procedure
as if nothing more were a t stake than the removal of a benign
growth. Yet information about fetal development may be more
significant than anything else in shaping the woman's decision.
It may have a crucial bearing on her postabortion mental
health.'g0And, leaving aside issues of maternal health, the state
has a strong and legitimate interest in being certain that all parties to the abortion decision clearly understand that the destruction of unborn human life will occur in the process.20o
Detailed informed consent provisions come closer than general statutes to ensuking that each woman contemplating abortion has the information she needs to make an informed decision.
In comparison to general statutes they do a better job of putting
the doctor on notice of his responsibility to give the patient relevant information in each of the critical areas: nature and risks of
the procedure, facts of reproduction and fetal development, and
abortion alternative^.^^' This is not to say that there are no problems with the detailed provisions. Compliance with such statutes
is more likely to degenerate into "disengaged monologues"2o2or
Miranda-style warnings than is compliance with a general statute. Moreover, while doctors are generally well qualified to provide medical information, they may not be fully aware of the
nonmedical information relevant to abortion alternatives. States
requiring doctors to provide such information203might follow the
lead of some European countries204and equip doctors with information packets that they can give to their patients. Such packets
should include addresses and phone numbers of public and private agencies that provide assistance to women with problem
198. See notes 107-09 and accompanying text supra.
199. See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
200. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,478 (1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438,446 (1977).
See also notes 102-04 and accompanying text supra.
201. See notes 58-75 and accompanying text supra.
202. See Katz, supra note 62, at 147.
203. See, e.g., Act of July 10, 1978, Act No. 435, sec. 1, 4 1299.35.6(B)(7),1978 La.
Sess. Law Serv. 836 (West)(to be codified as LA. REV. STAT.
ANN.§ 40:1299.35.6(B)(7)
(West)).
204. See, e.g., Act of Jan. 17, 1975, Law No. 75-17, art. L. 162-3(2) (Fr.), translated
in 26 WHO INT'L DIGEST,
supra note 110, at 352 (1975).
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pregnancies, as well as any additional information deemed useful.
A doctor should not, however, be able to comply with an informed
consent statute merely by handing a woman an information
packet. That would reduce what is at worst a ritual warning to a
silent (and totally inadequate) litany.

C. Waiting Period Requirements
For informed consent provisions to be maximally effective,
the required information ought to be provided well in advance of
the abortion procedure. The twenty-four-hour period prior to the
performance of an abortion is a period of great ambivalence and
distress.205Giving the woman information and counseling a t that
point will probably not aid in her decisionmaking process and
may even produce a great deal of anxiety.2wSeveral European
countriesm and some statesa8 have responded to this problem by
requiring that the woman receive counseling or informed consent
information anywhere from a day to a week before the abortion.
Since the twenty-four-hour period prior to the abortion is such a
critical time, it would be best if the informing and counseling
were completed at least twenty-four hours before the abortion
decision is firmly made. In the designated waiting period, the
woman will have sufficient time to weigh the information she has
received, make her decision, and give her informed consent to any
procedure she chooses. The delay can thus 'make a substantial
contribution to expanding her rational autonomy.lD9And, in most
instances, a waiting period from one day to several days is not
long enough to impact on the safety of the procedure or the type
of procedure that could be used to perform an abortion.210Of
course, in emergency or life-threatening situations, the imposition of a waiting period may be unreasonable or medically unsafe.
205. Nadelson, supra note 54, a t 768.
206. See id.
207. See, e.g., Act of Jan. 17, 1975, Law No. 75-17, art. L. 162-5 (Fr.) (one week),
translated in 26 WHO INT'LDIGEST,supra note 110, a t 351, 353 (1975); STRAPGESETZBUCH
[STGB] (i 218b (1) (W. Ger.)(three days), translated in 27 WHO INT'L
DIGEST,supm note
110, at ,564 (1976).
208. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT.(i 436.023 (1977) (24 hours); Ad of July 10, 1978, Act
No. 435, sec. 1, (i 1299.35.7, 1978 La. Sess. Law Serv. 836 (West) (to be codified as LA.
REV.STAT.ANN. 40:1299.35.7 (West)).
209. See Dworkin, supra note 25, at 123-24.
210. Physicians are unable to determine the length of gestation in any one pregnancy
with sufficient accuracy to enable a 24-hour period to serve as a transition between trimesters or to affect a judgment of fetal nonviability. Wolfe v. Schroering, 541 F.2d 523, 526
(6th Cir. 1976).
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Currently, informed consent statutes in eight states provide for
exceptions to normal consent requirements in life-threatening situ a t i o n ~ . Such
~ ~ ' exceptions should be built into all informed consent statutes and should apply to waiting period requirements.
The constitutionality of a waiting period provision poses
slightly different issues than that of informed consent provisions
in general, but the result should be the same. In Wolfe v.
S~hroering,"~
the only case to consider a waiting period requirement to date, the Sixth Circuit sustained the validity of a twentyfour-hour provision.213The court reasoned that a one-day delay
would not result in a transition from one trimester to the next,
and did ,not "significantly" burden the abortion process.214Since
the Supreme Court has concluded states may require informed
consent even during the first trime~ter,~l%ndhas allowed state
action not constituting "unduly burdensome interference" with
the abortion deci~ion,~l%hort
waiting periods should be constitutional. After all, reasonable waiting periods are tolerated in a
number of other areas, even when they limit the exercise of fundamental rights. Most states require some waiting period between
the application for a marriage license and the marriage.217Similarly, voters may be required to register prior to the date of an
After the first trimester, the woman's need for information to assist in the making of a rational abortion choice and
the often stressful results of withholding such information until
the time of the procedure are sufficiently related to the state's
then-compelling interest in maternal health to justify a reasonable waiting period requirement.

D. Enforcing Informed Consent Provisions

A final point needs to be made about enforcing compliance
with informed consent statutes. While most members of the medical profession would no doubt comply with such statutes in good
faith, there is always the possibility that any given physician
211. IDAHO
CODESj 18-609 (Supp. 1978); KY.REV. STAT.Sj 436.010 (1977); MASS.GEN.
Sj 126 (West Supp. 1978-1979); MWN.STAT.ANN. Sj 145.412 (West
Supp. 1978); MONT.REV. CODESANN. Sj 94-5-616 (1977); N.D. CENT.CODESj 14-02.1-03
(Supp. 1977); 35 PA. CONS.STAT.ANN. Sj 6603 (Purdon 1977); UTAHCODEANN.4 76-7-315

LAWS ANN. ch. 112,

541 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 526.

Id.
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1976).
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977).
H. CLARK,
LAWOF DOMESTIC
RELATIONS
38 (1968).
See Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973); Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973).
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might treat such obligations cavalierly. Thus, most informed consent statutes make failure to comply a rni~demeanor."~
Although
criminal sanctions may be important as a last resort, prosecutors
are likely to proceed against doctors only rarely, with the result
that such sanctions would be underenforced. Moreover, it is primarily the criminal dimension of informed consent statutes that
gives rise to the void-for-vagueness problem discussed in connection with the Wynn case above;220
the vagueness doctrine is normally inapplicable in civil context^."^ For these reasons, states
may wish to pay greater attention to civil remedies that would
provide compliance incentives.
In most states, the impact on civil litigation of noncompliance with informed consent provisions is solely a matter of case
law. Illinois appears to be the only state that has established by
statute the civil consequences of noncompliance. Illinois' informed consent statute provides that "[alny intentional violation of this section shall be admissible in a civil suit as prima facie
evidence of the physician's failure to obtain an informed consent."222In the absence of similarly specific legislation, courts
may hold that noncompliance with an informed consent statute
invokes the doctrine of "negligence per se."223The resulting reallocation of the burden of proof may encourage doctors to comply
with the statute. However, application of the negligence per se
doctrine will have widely differing results in different jurisdic219. Illinois Abortion Law of 1975, 8 3(2), Iu.ANN. STAT.ch. 38, 8 81-23 (Smith-Hurd
1977); Mo. ANN.STAT.4 188.075 (Vernon Supp. 1978); MONT.REV.CODESANN. 8 94-5616(5) (1977); 35 PA. CONS.STAT.ANN. 4 6603(e) (Purdon 1977); UTAHCODEANN. 4 76-7314(3) (1978). Minnesota makes failure to comply a felony. MINN.STAT.ANN. § 145.412
subd. 4 (West Supp. 1978). Kentucky and Massachusetts impose fines of up to $1,000 and
$2,000 respectively. Kentucky also imposes a penalty of one year in prison. KY. REV.STAT.
Q 311.990(13) (1977); MASS. GEN. LAWSANN. ch. 112, 4 12T (West Supp. 1978-1979).
Missouri provides for revocation of the physician's professional license as well as a misdemeanor conviction. Mo. ANN.STAT.8 188.065 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
220. See notes 186-95 and accompanying text supra.
221. See generally Note, Vagueness Doctrine in the Federal Courts: A Focus on the
Military, Prison, and Campus Contexts, 26 STAN.L. REV. 855, 855 n.1 (1974); Note, The
Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA.L. REV.67, 69 n.16 (1960).
In recent years, there has been some extension of the vagueness doctrine to civil statutes,
but this has been true primarily in areas where civil remedies are closely analogous in their
impact to criminal sanctions. See Note, Vagueness Doctrine in the Federal Courts: A
ficus on the Military, Prison, and Campus Contexts, 26 STAN.L. REV.855, 862 & n.32
(1974). Where the civil statute merely involves shifting the burden of proof in ordinary
civil litigation, as suggested in the text, vagueness concerns would be unlikely to arise.
222. Illinois Abortion Law of 1975, 8 3(2), Iu.ANN.STAT.ch. 38, 8 81-23 (Smith-Hurd
1977). The Missouri statute provides that nothing contained therein will exempt any
person from civil liability for negligent acts. Mo. ANN. STAT.8 188.085 (Vernon Supp.
1978).
supra note 156, 8 36, a t 200-02.
223. W. PROSSER,
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ti on^;^^^ in at least some, the practical impact on potential physi-

cian liability will be de minimus.
Because of the amorphous and unsettled state of case law
governing the civil significance of informed consent requirements
and the doctrine of negligence per se, greater clarity could be
achieved for all affected parties if legislatures would follow Illinois' lead and incorporate clear statements of the civil consequences of noncompliance into informed consent statutes. Such
statements could track the language of the Illinois statute and
make noncompliance with an informed consent statute prima
facie evidence of failure to obtain informed consent. Legislatures
could establish rebuttable or irrebuttable presumptions of malpractice. They could also establish presumptions that would operate to benefit physicians.
Doctors might welcome informed consent provisions requiring that detailed written consent be given. Such provisions would
help insulate them against charges of inadequate disclosure by
providing written evidentiary documents that would avoid the
necessity of relying on vague or contradictory recollections of a
particular discussion crucial to a malpractice case.225Doctors may
also appreciate legislative guidelines concerning the proper medical standard for informed consent because abortion has greater
emotional and moral overtones than most medical procedures
involved in malpractice cases. The standards normally applicable
in other malpractice cases may be meaningless if abortion malpractice trials degenerate into microcosmic showdowns between
pro-abortion and anti-abortion forces, as has happened in a number of recent abortion-related cases.226
224. The possible effects on civil litigation of violating a state statute have been
described as follows:
(1) Such conduct is conclusively negligence as a matter of law;
(2) Such conduct is presumed to be negligence as a matter of law until evidence is received tending to show that the violation was excusable under
the circumstances;
(3) Such conduct is prima facie evidence of negligence, so that from the violation alone the jury may infer that the person was negligent;
(4) Such conduct is evidence of negligence which the jury may consider, but
is not, standing alone, sufficient to support a finding of negligence; or
(5) The conduct may, in itself, constitute negligence or may be evidence of it,
but the fact is wholly irrelevant that a statute . . was violated in the
process.
Comment, Contributory Negligence in Five Midwestern States-Some Rarrier.~for Plaintiff to Hurdle in Auto Accident Cases, 1954 Wm. L. REV.95, 116. The author implies that
the first and fifth options are rarely the rule and warns that the standard may differ
depending on which statute has been violated. Id. a t 116-17.
225. Note, Who's Afraid of Informed Consent? An AffirmativeApproach to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 44 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 241, 259-62 (1978).
359 N.E.2d 4 (1976); The
226. See, e . g , Commonwealth v. Edelin, -Mass. ,

.
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Overall, then, there is much to be said for detailed informed
consent statutes that include provisions governing civil liability
for noncompliance. Such provisions help ensure a meaningful
doctor-patient interaction that will permit maximum autonomy
to the woman faced with an abortion decision.
IV. COUNSELING

A.

The Appropriateness of Counseling Requirements

While informed consent statutes can make a substantial contribution to meaningful doctor-patient interaction, there is something awkward, something unmistakably wooden about the informed consent approach. It is as if the law were being used to
bludgeon a human relationship into existence. The needed interpersonal dynamics are too rich to be captured in the dead language of a statute and too dependent on natural fellow feeling to
be coerced. These considerations suggest that skillful counseling
is the ideal approach to assuring that the woman receives the
information and help she needs in determining whether or not to
obtain an abortion. Indeed, as one contemplates the Supreme
Court's emphasis on the "consulting physician,"227it seems clear
that counseling is precisely what the Supreme Court had in mind.
In the Court's mythology of the doctor-patient relationship, the
woman reaches the decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy only after careful and sensitive consultation with a medical
expert who is aware not only of her physical situation, but of her
emotional, psychological, and familial needs as well.22u
Counseling transcends other approaches to assisting the
woman precisely because its aim is not merely to provide her with
information, but also to help her make an extremely personal
decision in a sensitive and personal manner. But the same highly
personal dimension of counseling that gives it its flexibility and
appeal may constitute the primary obstacle to implementing
abortion-counseling schemes in the United States. Counseling is
so inherently personal that by its very nature it eludes easy and
mechanical management. The resulting uncertainties about the
precise impact of counseling on the abortion decisionmaking process exacerbate the constitutional questions surrounding the perTrial of Dr. Waddill, NEWSWEEK,
Apr. 3, 1978, at 35; The Ordeal of a Divided Jury, TIME,
May 22, 1978, at 24.
227. See, e.g., Colautti v. Franklin, 47 U.S.L.W.4094, 4096-97 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1979);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153, 163-64 (1973). See also notes 1-10 and accompanying text
supra.
228. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
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missibility of mandatory counseling schemes. Moreover, from a
purely political perspective, however much competing pressure
groups may favor counseling in principle, they may be reluctant
to press for it in practice because there is no way for them to feel
confident about the content of the counseling that would be rendered. As long as there are fears that it would be constitutionally
impermissible or effectively impossible to control the orientation
of counseling, pro-life groups will worry that counseling might
tend to assuage guilt rather than deter abortions, and pro-choice
groups will fear that counseling might degenerate into harassment of the woman seeking an abortion.22Y
Legally mandated
counseling has thus failed to emerge in the United States.
Yet the need for counseling is acute. There is a wealth of
information attesting to the need for counseling in the abortion
context.2mAs a consequence, many European countries that have
recently liberalized their abortion laws have paid careful attention to integrating cdunseling into the abortion process.231In the
United States, the need to assure that at least some counseling
occurs within the confines of the doctor-patient relationship has
been heightened in the aftermath of Danforth. Since Danforth
may tend to isolate the woman making the abortion decision from
typical sources of social and emotional support by denying her
parents, spouse, or the father of the child a final say in the abortion choice, the woman may be in particularly great need of sensitive personal help from her doctor. Experience in Germany has
suggested that counseling may be particularly significant for minors faced with the difficult abortion choice.232In post-Danforth
America, therefore, counseling with the woman's consulting physician takes on added significance if the isolated woman's overall
needs in the abortion context are to be met.233To the extent that
political realities and apprehensions about constitutionality operate to preclude the emergence of counseling schemes, women in
need of counseling are the ultimate losers.
The solution to this situation appears to lie in rethinking the
-

-

-

229. See O'Reilly, supra note 73, at 74.
230. See, e.g., Bracken, supra note 54, at 265-66; Butler & Fujita, supra note 48, at
210-12; Kay & Thompson, An Outcome Evaluation of Counseling Services Provided by
Abortion Clinics, 15 MED.CARE858, 858-59 (1977); Marglolis, Some Thoughts on Medical
Evaluation and Counseling of Applicants for Abortion, 14 CLINICAL
OBSTETRICS
&
GYNECOLOGY
1255, 1257 (1971); Nadelson, supra note 54, at 767-69; West & Walsh, supra
note 54.
231. See notes 234-71 and accompanying text infra.
232. See Beulke, Zur Reform des Schwangerschaftsabbruches durch das 15. Strafrecht~&zderurzgsgesetz,1976 ZE~CHRIFT
F ~ ! R DAS GEsAMTE FAMILIENRECHT
596, 597.
233. See notes 87-90 and accompanying text supra.
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implications of Roe u. Wade and its progeny. Once one begins
analyzing the Supreme Court's abortion decisions as rooted in a
concern for rational female autonomy, arguing for the permissibility of a t least certain types of counseling schemes becomes
easier. Before turning to the constitutional issues, however, it will
be useful to consider three differing approaches to counseling that
have been developed in Europe. This will provide a basis for a
better understanding of the varying ways in which counseling can
be integrated into an abortion scheme, and will make possible a
more concrete analysis of the constitutional issues.

B. European Counseling Schemes
I.

Germany

In part because of the unique history of abortion reform efforts in Germany, counseling has assumed a particularly important role in the legislative scheme governing abortion there. The
current abortion statuteu4was passed in response to the West
German Constitutional Court's 1975 determination that a prior
abortion liberalization scheme235was uncon~titutional.~~~
The
law2" provides that abortion constitutes a criminal offense except
when performed by a physician, with the pregnant woman's consent, and within appropriate time limits238when a generalized
"indication" of a need for the abortion is present. The generalized
234. STGB !j!j218-219(W. Ger.), as amended by Das 15. Strafrechtsanderungsgesetz
vom 18.5.1976, translated in 27 WHO INT'LDIGEST,supra note 110, a t 562-65 (1976).
235. The text of the initial West German abortion legislation of 1974 is available in
25 WHO INT'LDIGEST,supra note 110, at 779-83 (1974).
236. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, BVerfGE, W. Ger., 39 Bundesverfassungsgericht
[BVerfGEl 1 (1975). This judgment was also published in 2 EUROP~ISCHE
GRUNDRECHTE
ZEITSCHRIFT126; 1975 JURISTENZEITUNG
205; 127 NEUEJURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIF~
574
(1975). English translations of the judgment were published in Jonas & Gorby, West
German Abortion Decision: A Contrast to Roe v. Wade, 9 J. MAR.
J. PRAC.
& PROC.605
(1976); E. JANN,THE ABORT~ON
DECISION
OF FEBRUARY
25, 1975 OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT,
FEDERAL
REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY
(1975).
237. Specifically, STGB 4 218a(l) (W. Ger.) provides that:
(1) The termination of pregnancy performed by a physician shall not be
punishable . . . provided that:
.

.

.

a

2. according to medical findings, a pregnancy termination is indicated, taking account of the present and future living conditions of the
pregnant woman, in order to avert a risk to the life or a risk of serious
damage to the physical or mental state of health of the pregnant
woman, and such risk cannot be averted by any other means that the
woman can be expected to accept.
Id., translated in 27 WHO INT'LDIGEST,s w r a note 110. at 563 (1976).
238. A pregnancy may only be terminated on the basis of the eugenic indication
within the first 22 weeks following conception, or on the basis of the juridical or social
indications within the first 12 weeks. Id. 4 218a(3).
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indication is present whenever, in light of the totality of the
woman's circumstances, the woman cannot reasonably be expected to continue with the pregnancy because of grave risk to her
physical or mental health.239The statute further establishes a
presumption that the generalized indication is present if there is
a compelling reason to assume that the child would be born with
a severe birth defect (eugenic indication), if the pregnancy is the
result of an unlawful act such as rape or incest (juridical indication), or if the general circumstances of the woman's life place her
in such state of material necessity (Notlage) that she cannot
fairly be expected to continue with the pregnancy (social indication)
In addition to requiring that the presence of one of these
indications be confirmed by a doctor other than the doctor that
will perform the abortion,241
the statute provides that anyone who
performs an abortion on a woman who has not received counseling a t least three days before the abortion from an individual or
agency legally authorized to provide such counseling is subject to
criminal sanctions.242The woman herself is not subject to punishment under this provision on the theory that she is more likely
to seek counseling'if she knows there is absolutely no legal risk
associated with her doing so. A broad network of counseling centers has been established; as of the end of 1976, there were more
than 600 centers where free abortion counseling could be obtained.243In addition, the statute provides that the counseling
may be given by a doctor (other than the one performing the
abortion) if he has appropriate qualifications to give the requisite
c~unseling.~'~
The wording of the statute makes it clear that the
239. Id. 5 218a(1)2.
240. Id. 5 218a(2).
241. Id. 4 219.
242. Id. 5 218b (providing for imprisonment of up to one year and a criminal fine).
243. Franz, Kosten der sozialen Beratung nach der Reform des ,f 218 StGR, 29 NEUE
JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRI~
1085, 1086 (1977) (citing INFORMATIONEN
DES B U N D E S I ~ I S TERIUMS
JUCEND,
FAMILIE
UND GESUNDHEIT,
ZURPRAKTIZIERUNG
DER NEUREGELUNG
UBER
DEN SCHWANGERSCHAFTSABBRUCH
3 (1976)).
244. See notes 250-54 and accompanying text infra. One of the difficult problems
currently being faced in the course of implementing the new German abortion statute
concerns the question of who pays for counseling services provided by the doctor instead
of by one of the many free counseling centers. State insurance coverage may be construed
as denying coverage for counseling provided by a doctor concerning the woman's social
situation, and a growing number of doctors and health institutions are proceeding on the
basis of this construction. See Franz, supra note 243, a t 1087. However this problem is
ultimately resolved in Germany, its existence points to an important practical issue that
must ultimately be faced in the United States if more intensive counseling requirements
are adopted here. Will insurance coverage and state or federal funding be available to
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counseling must occur in person; counseling over the telephone
for example would not suffice.245
Two phases or components of counseling are envisioned. The
first, which must be obtained a t least three days before the abortion is performed, is generally referred to as social counseling. The
statute requires that the pregnant woman be apprised of the variety .of public and private sources of aid available to assist her with
both the continuation of her pregnancy and the alleviation of
difficult circumstances that might accrue as a result of an additional child. While the statute itself does not specify any particular orientation for this counseling, it is quite clear from the background of the legislation that it is to be given a pro-life direction .24fi
-

-

- -

-

-

cover the cost of the increased expenditure of a doctor's time necessitated by more extensive counseling?
245. See Beulke, supra note 232, at 600; Laufhiitte & Wilkitzki, Zur Reform der
S trafvorschriften iiber den Schwangerschaftsa b bruch, 1976 JURISTENZEITUNG
329, 333.
246. The prior abortion legislation struck down by the constitutional court provided
that there would he no criminal sanctions for a woman who obtained an abortion after
receiving counseling during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy. See 25 WHO INT'LDIGEST,
supra note 110, at 779-83 (1974). Advocates of the time-phase approach to regulating
abortion during the early phase of pregnancy, which was incorporated in the prior law,
had argued that developing life is better protected by individual counseling of the pregnant woman than by penal sanctions. Penal sanctions might deter a woman from seeking
counseling for fear that she would reveal her pregnancy a t the counseling stage and then
be unable to obtain an abortion in the event the counseling did not indicate an abortion.
See Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, BVerfGE, W. Ger., 39 BVerfGE 1, 52 (1975); Jonas &
Gorby, supra note 236, at 650. The court rejected this aproach for two reasons. The major
reason was that the time-phase approach, despite its counseling feature, legalized even
nonindicated abortion during the first trimester. The court held that this was inconsistent
with the state's obligation to .protect incipient life under the German Constitution. 39
BVerfGE a t 53-54; Jonas & Gorby, supra note 236, at 651-52. The second objection to the
counseling scheme in the earlier legislation was that it appeared to require only that the
woman be "instructed" (unterrichtet) concerning "the public and private assistance
available for pregnant women, mothers, and the children, particularly concerning such
assistance which alleviates the continuation of the pregnancy and the situation of the
mother and child." 39 BVerfGE a t 61; Jonas & Gorby, supra note 236, at 657-58. In the
court's view, mere instruction was not enough. The court's criticism of the prior counseling scheme implied that, to be consonant with German constitutional requirements, the
counseling must be directed toward persuading a woman to continue her pregnancy. See
39 BVerfGE a t 61-62; Jonas & Gorby, supra note 236, a t 657-58. Moreover, the court
indicated that a counseling scheme equipped with the capacity to provide direct financial
assistance in appropriate cases in addition to mere advice would be less objectionable in
that such a scheme would be much more likely to play a determinative role in deterring
abortions. See 39 BVerfGE at 61; Jonas & Gorby, supra note 236, a t 657. Under the new
statute, the term "unterrichtet" has been replaced with a much stronger term (beraten)
which has a meaning somewhere between "counseled" and "admonished." Commentators
have been alert to the difference, and it is well understood that the type of counseling now
required must aim a t protecting developing life. See, e.g., Beulke, supra note 232, at 600;
Lackner, Die Neuregelung des Schwangerschaftsabbruchs, 28 NEUEJURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIF~
1233, 1239-40 (1976); Laufhiitte & Wilkitzki, supra note 245, a t 333.
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The second aspect of the current German counseling scheme
requires that the woman be counseled concerning the medically
significant aspects of the procedure.247This counseling may or
may not be provided by the same individual who provides the
social counseling. Although the statute is unclear as to whether
or not the social counseling must precede the medical counseling,
this order would appear to make sense if the two are to be conducted separately.24nSignificantly, counseling is not required
even under the new statute in situations where the reason for the
abortion is a threat to the life or physical health of the mother.24Y
Assessing the qualifications of those rendering the counseling
service 1s one of the difficult problems under the German scheme.
The problem relates not to the qualifications of those working for
government counseling centers, churches, or other such organizations that have historically played a significant role in abortion
counseling,25obut with the qualifications physicians must have in
order to provide the required counseling. In its 1975 abortion
decision, the constitutional court sharply questioned whether
physicians could give competent social coun~eling.~~'
Physicians,
the court reasoned, are experts in medical matters, but cannot be
expected to have expertise in the intricacies of German social
welfare law (e.g., they may not be familiar with sources of rental
assistance, income assistance, and other sources of state aid that
may alleviate the problems leading a woman to seek an aborti~n).A
~ "number
~
of scholars have accordingly voiced doubts
about whether the qualifications a doctor must have in order to
~ ~sufficient to meet the constitutional
provide c o ~ n s e l i n gare
247. STGB Q 218b(1)2 (W. Ger.), translated in 27 WHO INT'LDIGEST,supra note 110,
at 564 (1976).
248. See Laufhiitte & Wilkitzki, supra note 245, a t 333.
249. STGB Q 218b(3) (W. Ger.), translated in 27 WHO INT'LDIGEST,supra note 110,
at 564 (1976).
250. Section 218b(2) specifies that "a counseling center recognized by an authority
[Behiirde] or corporation, institution, or foundation of public law" (authors' translation)
may perform the statutory counseling. Id. 4 218b(2)1. Since all major and most minor
religious denominations are public law entities (Korperschaften des Offentlichen Rechts),
see generally Solte, Die Organisationsstruktur der Kirchen und Religionsgemeinschafter,
in 1 HANDBUCH
DES STAATSKIRCHENRECHTS
DER BUNDESREPUBLIK
DEUTSCHLAND
341 (E. Friesenhahn, U. Scheuner, & J. List1 eds. 1974), the foregoing provision makes it clear that
these denominations may recognize and thereby authorize counseling centers. See
Laufhiitte & Wilkitzki,. supra note 245, a t 334 (noting that the legislative purpose for
giving these various entities such authorizing power was to establish a broad network of
counseling centers).
251. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, BVerfGE, W. Ger., 39 BVerfGE 1, 62-63 (1975);
Jonas & Gorby, supra note 236, a t 658-59.
252. 39 BVerfGE a t 62-63, Jonas & Gorby, supra note 236, a t 658-59.
253. Counseling may be provided by a physician if: (1) he is a member of a recognized
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court's objections to doctor-provided counseling under the previous statutory scheme.2MSimilar concerns could obviously arise
with regard to physician counseling in the United States.
One of the interesting points of the German counseling
scheme is that its initial proponents under the prior law were
convinced that counseling would be more efficacious in the context of a time-phase resolution to the abortion controversy, such
as that adopted in the United States, than in the statutory indication solution ultimately adopted? As noted above, they were
convinced that more women would actually seek counseling if
they viewed it as a ticket to a legal abortion rather than part of a
larger state strategy explicitly aimed at deterring abortions. This
is significant, because it suggests that the introduction of counseling requirements in the United States may be even more beneficial than counseling as it exists in Germany since the Supreme
Court's rulings here have precluded the possibility of counseling
schemes designed to impose substantive constraints on the
woman's ultimate abortion choice during the first trimester of
pregnancy.
2. France

Like Germany, France has recently liberalized its abortion
laws and has also integrated a counseling scheme into this new
legal framework. Under French law, a woman in "a situation of
di~tress"~"
may make a request'for the termination of her pregcounseling center; (2) he has been recognized as a counselor by a public law entity, see
note 250, supra; or (3) he has obtained information regarding assistance available in
individual cases by consulting with a staff member of an approved counseling center.
STGB (5 2186(2)2 (W. Ger.), translated in 27 WHO INT'LDIGEST,supra note 110, a t 564
(1976).Understandably, the third method of qualification has attracted the most criticism
because it is difficult to see how any physician can fail to meet its requirements.
254. See, e.g., Beulke, supra note 232, a t 601. Cf. Laufhiitte & Wilkitzki, supra note
245, a t 334-35 (arguing that the new rules do meet the constitutional court's objections
concerning a physician's lack of qualification in the social counseling area if they are
narrowly construed).
255. See Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, BVerfGE, W. Ger., 39 BVerfGE 1, 52 (1975);
Jonas & Gorby, supra note 236, a t 650. Cf. Lackner, supra note 246, a t 1240 (noting that
a counseling scheme has a different significance in a statutory scheme that takes a timephase approach to the problem than it has where the indication approach has been
adopted).
256. Neither the text of the statute, Act of Jan. 17, 1975, Law No. 75-17, art. L. 1621 to -14 (Fr.), translated in 26 WHO INT'L
DIGEST,supra note 110, a t 351-54 (1975), nor
the decision of the French Constitutional Court sustaining the statute, Judgment of Jan.
15, 1975, Con. const., Fr., [I9751 Juris-Classeur periodique, la semaine juridique
(J.C.P.1 I1 18030, translated in A. VON MEHREN
& J. GORDLEY,
THECIVILLAWSYSTEM:
AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE COMPARATIVE
STUDY
OF LAW337 (2d ed. 1977), articulates what
constitutes a "situa~ionof distress." Presumably, it would be a situation similar to one
constituting a "social indication" in Germany.
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nancy, and, provided she complies with the counseling requirements imposed by law, may obtain an abortion prior to the tenth
week of pregnan~y.~"
The French counseling scheme involves two stages. The first
is similar in many respects to detailed informed consent statutes
in the United States. T h a t is, a physician who has been approached by a woman seeking an abortion must inform her of the
medical risks involved and must provide her with an information
folder containing "(a) a list of the rights, forms of assistance, and
benefits guaranteed by the law to families, mothers, including
unmarried mothers, and their children, as well as the possibilities
offered by child adoption; (b) a list of the names and addresses
of [counseling institutions]. "258
Once a woman has received this information she must receive counseling from an approved counseling institution.259The
counseling involved must consist of a private interview during
which the woman is to be provided with the assistance and advice
appropriate to her situation and, importantly, with the necessary
means to resolve the problems posed.26oWhile it is not clear from
the statute exactly how much the approved institutions are able
to do in terms of pioviding direct financial assistance, it is clear
that affirmative help is to be provided through the counseling
system to help alleviate social or economic problems that may be
leading the woman to seek a termination of her pregnancy.
Once the woman has received the requisite counseling, she
is free to repeat her request for an a b ~ r t i o n . ~There
"
must be a t
least one week between the time that the woman first requests an
abortion and the time that a doctor receives confirmation from
the woman that she still desires the abortion.2e2Assuming that
the ten-week period from conception has not lapsed, the doctor
is then free to perform the abortion himself or to provide the
257. Act of Jan. 17, 1975, Law No. 75-17, art. L. 162-1 to -14 (Fr.), translated in 26

WHO INT'LDIGEST,supra note 110, a t 351-54 (1975).A woman may also obtain an abortion
"at any stage of gestation if two physicians certify . . . that the continuation of the
pregnancy is seriously endangering the woman's health or that there is a strong possibility
that the unborn child is suffering from a particularly serious disease or condition considered as incurable at the time of diagnosis." Id. art. L. 162-12. As in Germany, the counseling requirements are not triggered for therapeutic abortions. The French scheme differs
in not requiring counseling for abortions indicated on eugenic grounds.
258. Id. art. L. 162-3(2)(a)-(b).
259. Article L. 163-4 provides that she must "consult a family information, counselling, or advisory establishment, a family planning or education centre, a social welfare
service, or any other approved institution . . . ." Id. art. L. 162-4.
260. Id.
261. Id. art. L. 162-5.
262. Id.
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woman with a document certifying that he has completed his
portion of the counseling requirements so that the woman may
apply to another physician for the abortion without having to
repeat these steps.263
The counseling scheme in France thus appears to be similar
in many respects to that in Germany. It is obviously designed to
help provide the woman with information and resources that may
alleviate the problems leading her to seek an abortion: The
French scheme is more explicit than the German plan, however,
in its recognition that the woman may choose to reject the advice
received from the approved counseling centers and request an
abortion. Once that decision has been reached, the position of the
French statutory scheme seems to be that the state has done all
it can to inform the woman of the value of the potential life at
stake. The ultimate decision is then left to the individual woman.
Under the German scheme, a woman who desires an abortion
after counseling may not lawfully obtain one unless an abortion
is indicated in her case.
3. Iceland

A rather different approach to counseling has been adopted
I
~
"
Icelandic law, a woman may obtain an aborin e l a n d . ~Under
tion if the termination of pregnancy is called for as a result of
medical, eugenic, juridical, or social indications. The circumstances giving rise to the social indication are rather loosely
drawn. The statute speaks in terms of "unsurmountable social
circumstance^,"^^^ but examples of circumstances that will give
rise to this situation include "the presence of young children" in
the home and situations where a woman, apparently without
regard to her economic circumstances, has given birth to several
children at frequent intervals and only a short time has elapsed
since the previous birth.266
Under the Icelandic statute everyone has a right to counseling,2R7
but counseling is not mandatory except to the extent that
a woman seeking an abortion "must have been informed of the
risks associated with the procedure and have received information as to the social assistance which she is entitled to receive
-

-

-

263. Id. art. L. 162-6.
264. Act of May 22, 1975 (Iceland), translated i n 28
110, at 614-16 (1977).
265. Id. 5 9(1).
266. Id. 5 9(l)(a)-(b).
267. Id. 5 1.

WHO ~

DIGEST,
supra note

T ' L
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from the community."26nIn any event, "[all1 counseling and
information shall be given impartially."26gThus, while individuals may receive basically the same counseling that would be
available in France or Germany (i.e. medical assistance, pregnancy testing, interviews intended to provide advice and support,
and social assistance),270the counseling is just as likely to be
oriented toward providing support for a decision to terminate a
pregnancy, as encouraging a woman to carry her pregnancy full
term? Counseling in Iceland is thus clearly nondirective in nature and is by no means mandatory.

C. Permissible Counseling Schemes in the United States
The German, French, and Icelandic counseling schemes are
indicative of a spectrum of possible approaches that might be
considered in the United States, ranging from mandatory, oriented counseling at the one extreme to optional, nondirective
counseling a t the other. Before proceeding with the effort to analyze precisely where along this continuum the constitutional line
between permissible and impermissible schemes lies, two preliminary points should be made.
First, there can be no doubt that a state may take steps to
make counseling services along the lines of the Icelandic model
available to women desiring them. As long as the woman is not
required to submit to counseling in order to obtain an abortion,
counseling services are merely one of a wide range of social services that the state may permissibly provide. Indeed, as long as
the counseling is optional, there would appear to be no objection
to counseling oriented toward encouraging normal childbirth. Of
course, if it were widely known that the aim of state counselors
was to dissuade women from obtaining an abortion, relatively few
women seeking an abortion would choose to undergo such counseling. In an optional system, nondirective counseling would accordingly be much more likely not only to meet genuine counseling needs but also to reduce the number of abortions obtained.
Greater attention should be paid to the potential value of voluntary counseling schemes both by those concerned with meeting
the needs of women considering abortion and by those anxious to
encourage greater sensitivity to the value of fetal life.
Second, while the German mandatory, oriented counseling
Ei 12.
269. Id.
270. Id. 0 6.
271. Id. 09 2, 6(5).
268. Id.
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has a definite pro-life cast, it must be remembered that counseling with an opposite orientation is equally conceivable. In countries with severe population problems, for instance, it is easy to
imagine the introduction of a counseling system with a definite
pro-abortion slant. Both possibilities must be considered when
one evaluates the constitutionality of mandatory, directive counseling.
The difficult constitutional issues with respect to counseling
center on three questions. First, is a mandatory counseling
scheme of any type permissible under Roe u. Wade and its progeny, particularly during the first trimester? Second, assuming
that some mandatory counseling is permissible, to what extent
can a state legislature insist that the counseling have a particular
orientation? That is, may a system as rigorously pro-life as the
German scheme be adopted or is the apparently nondirective
form of counseling called for under the French scheme the most
that can be required? Third, can counseling with anyone other
than the woman's consulting physician be mandated? To simplify the analysis, it will be useful to proceed by analyzing the
first two questions on the assumption that it is counseling by the
attending physician that is in issue. Broader questions about the
permissibility of mandatory third-party counseling can more easily be dealt with in conjunction with the third question.
With regard to the first question, the Supreme Court's allowance of mandatory informed consent provisions and mandatory
recordkeeping and reporting procedures even during the first
trimester,272taken together with the Supreme Court's heavy insistence on the significance of doctor-patient consultation in the
abortion de~ision,~~9uggests
that an appropriately limited counseling requirement may be permissible. As this Article has
S ~ O W Ithe
I , ~crucial
~~
issue under current case law is whether a
particular counseling scheme operates as an "unduly burdensome
i n t e r f e r e n ~ e ~ ~ ~the
w i twoman's
h
abortion choice. As long as a
scheme is carefully designed to avoid such interference, the strict
"compelling state interest" test would not come into play, and
the scheme's constitutionality would be evaluated in terms of the
more flexible "rational basis" te~t.~~"incea counseling scheme
would further legitimate state interests in promoting female autonomy, protecting maternal health, and encouraging normal
-

272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

-

-

-

-

See notes 130-38, 154-58 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 1-12 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 100-04 and accompanying text supra.
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977).
See notes-94-104 and accompanying text supra.
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childbirth,277meeting this more relaxed standard would not be a
problem.
With these principles in mind, there would appear to be no
constitutional obstacle to a statute requiring a doctor to provide
nondirective counseling to a patient seeking an abortion. In a
sense, the informed consent statutes discussed in Section I11 are
designed to promote indirectly that very result. They may be
viewed (and utilized) as a means of assuring that some minimal
quantum of counseling, whatever its content, has occurred.
Surely that which can be done indirectly via informed consent
statutes can be done directly with a counseling statute. A statute
requiring a woman to spend fifteen to thirty minutes counseling
with her physician before finalizing an abortion decision can
scarcely be characterized as an "unduly burdensome interference" with the abortion decision. Such a statute merely assures
materialization of the doctor-patient consultation that has been
a keystone of the Supreme Court's abortion decisions from the
beginning.
Any potential "harrassment" that a woman who is dead set
on obtaining an abortion might perceive in the counseling requirement is a trivial burden for her to bear, particularly when
compared with the enormity of the decision to snuff out unborn
life. The harassment concern pales even further when one realizes
that in the long run counseling actually facilitates the full, if
sometimes painful, exercise of the woman's autonomy along lines
consistent with her true interests and in ways that can alleviate
abiding psychological conflicts and
substantial
number of states impose counseling requirements in connection
with divorce proceedings,279even though fundamental liberty in"It
terests are at stake in the decision to obtain a d i v o r ~ e . ~ ~is
- --

--

-

-

-

- - -- -

p
p

277. Id.
278. One of the distressing ironies implicit in the "harassment" rhetoric is that it
pays lipservice to the value of woman's autonomy without fully respecting it. To charge
that counseling is ultimately a form of harassment is to overlook the deep need a woman
facing the abortion choice has of coming to grips with the full implications of her decision.
More importantly, it underestimates the likelihood that a woman considering an abortion
might decide, after deeper reflection, to continue her pregnancy. After all, abortion is not
the inevitable end product of rational, autonomous choice, and the decision to continue a
pregnancy is not necessarily the consequence of coercion or subtle psychological wizardry.
Counseling may demand painful self-assessment, but to attempt to shield a woman from
the imposition of this type of evaluative burden under the guise of protecting her from
harassment is ultimately to insulate her from assuming the full responsibility for personal
self-determination. Freedom of choice stripped of such self-confrontation is a hollow
mockery of genuine autonomy and perhaps the most devious form of paternalism.
MARRIAGE
AND DIVORCE
A m 8 305(b)(2).
279. See, e.g, UNIFORM
280. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380-83 (1971).
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difficult to see why the state's interests in requiring counseling
are any less significant or permissible in the abortion context.
Assuming that the state does not attempt to dictate the orientation of the counseling and the ultimate decision to which it leads,
counseling would appear to be perfectly consonant with the role
allocated the medical profession by Roe v. Wade.
Despite the close practical connection between informed consent and counseling requirements, there are a number of reasons
for preferring the latter, or a combination of the two. As a practical matter, much of the information required for informed consent declarations may be gathered by someone other than the
attending physician and glanced at only perfunctorily by the doctor. Moreover, even if the physician conducts the consent procedure himself, it is all too likely to degenerate into a Miranda-type
ritual.2n1Requiring the doctor to spend a reasonable amount of
time in a one-on-one encounter with the patient, preferably a day
or more before the proposed abortion,282and then to verify that
the decision to proceed with the abortion was reached only after
careful joint consideration of all relevant factors, would have a
number of salutary effects. Contrary to present realities, a requirement of this nature would assure that genuine doctorpatient consultation occurred. More importantly, by placing the
emphasis on the significance of the personal encounter, much
could be done to dissolve the woodenness of informed consent
procedure. Finally, a counseling requirement leaves much greater
flexibility to the doctor and the patient in developing their relationship. Whatever the force of Justice Blackmun's remark about
straitjacketing the physician in the context of informed consent
statutes," it is inapplicable with regard to nondirective counseling.
The situation with regard to directive counseling schemes is
more complex. In part, it depends on what is meant by "directive
counseling." If the scheme requires only that the counseling direct the woman's attention to certain facts relevant to her abortion decision, as in France, the counseling requirement is indistinguishable in effect from detailed informed consent provisions,
and should be sustained for the same reasons. On the other hand,
if those providing the counseling are required to actively attempt
to dissuade a woman from obtaining an abortion, as in the Ger281. See note 202 and accompanying text supra.
282. See notes 205-18 and accompanying text supra.
283. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 n.8 (1976). See notes 196-98
and accompanying text supra.
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man system, the scheme is much more questionable. There is a
major difference between providing information that will contribute to the making of a rational and autonomous choice and state
efforts to determine the content of that choice. A statute requiring directive counseling in this stronger sense would impose a
significant burden on the right to seek an abortion. Rather than
a mere effort to assure that meaningful doctor-patient interaction
occurred, the requirement would constitute active intervention in
the decisionmaking process of doctor and patient. It would demean rather than respect the woman's autonomy. Accordingly, a
statute of this nature should be unconstitutional.
The question whether women can be required to receive
counseling from parties other than their physicians is probably
the most difficult from a theoretical perspective. At issue are two
conflicting values shielded by the woman's privacy right. If the
stress is placed on nondisclosure of intimate c o n c e r n ~ , ~ ~ hifn d
Roe and Danforth stand for the proposition that a t least within
the first trimester there is no justification for the incremental
intrusion into a woman's privacy that would be required if the
woman was forced to seek counseling from someone other than a
doctor,2n5third-party counseling requirements would appear to be
unconstitutional. On the other hand, if rational autonomy is the
primary value a t ~take,~~"hereare a number of reasons why a
nondirective counseling requirement with qualified personnel
should be permissible. As noted by the constitutional court in
connection with the German counseling scheme,2n7doctors may
be less qualified than trained counselors to provide the information and support that a woman considering an abortion needs. If
the aim of counseling is expanding the woman's autonomy, restricting the field of potential counselors to physicians may be
counterproductive. Since a doctor's time is typically much more
expensive than the time of a qualified counselor or social worker,
the doctor requirement is also unattractive for economic reasons.
In deciding between the conflicting privacy values, one
should remember that the concern for nondisclosure is artificial
in the abortion context. In addition to the attending physician, a
number of satellite medical personnel are invariably involved in
carrying out abortion procedures. On the whole, the Court has
been much more concerned about intervention in the abortion
284.
285.
286.
287.

See notes 30-33 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 87-89 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 28-29, 39-47 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 251-52 and accompanying text supra.
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choice than about nondis~losure.~~There
are thus strong grounds
for arguing that a third-party counseling requirement should be
permissible to the extent that it effectively expands the rational
autonomy of those seeking abortions. As a practical matter, however, the tendency of the Court to strike down third-party constraints on the abortion decision2Rg
is so pronounced that a thirdparty counseling requirement would probably not be held constitutional. Moreover, the incremental burden of locating the counseling agency and attending a counseling session, while insignificant when compared with other values involved, might be
deemed a significant burden on the decision to obtain an abortion. Under Carey v. Population Services International, 2g0 this
might be enough to invalidate the third-party scheme.
While the constitutionality of a mandatory third-party counseling scheme is somewhat shaky, a mandatory nondirective
counseling scheme with a third-party option should be permissible for the same reasons that an Icelandic-type scheme would
be.291Some of the economic advantages of nondoctor counseling
might be obtained by passing a statute requiring counseling, but
allowing the woman to receive it in whole or in part from someone
other than her doctor if she wished. A state might set up free
counseling centers and require women seeking an abortion to receive counseling either from her personal physician or from the
free counseling center. Even though such a scheme would provide
obvious financial incentives to obtain counseling a t the free center, it would not be constitutionally objectionable under Maher
if the counseling requirement itself is permissible.2g2
One final issue that must be considered in conjunction with
counseling schemes concerns the qualifications of those providing
the counseling. At present, there are few standards for abortion
counselors.293Since abortion counseling is complex and emotional, the counseling role should be filled by someone with the
requisite expertise. This may necessitate a statutory mandate
288. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 709-10 (1977) (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (contending that requiring minors to
seek parental guidance, thereby requiring disclosure, would be consistent with existing
case law).
289. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 US.52,67-75 (1976) (spousal and parental
consent requirements); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 195-200 (1973) (hospital committee
of physician review of attending physician's judgment).
290. 431 U.S. 678, 688-89 & n.5 (1977).
291. See notes 264-71 and accompanying text supra.
292. See generally Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
185, 186293. Dauber, Profile of an Abortion Counselor, 6 FAM.PLAN.PERSPECI~VES
87 (1974).
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that physicians fulfill this role in the absence of counselors who
have complied with some type of certification procedure. The
state might even require that doctors providing such counseling
be certified themselves. This is not the place to explore the precise nature of counseling qualifications or the structure of a certification procedure. At some point, however, these issues must be
faced.

This Article is written from the perspective of two individuals deeply saddened by the spectacle of mounting abortion rates
in the United States. We are not insensitive to the issues and
values of advancing the autonomy of women, and recognize that
among the myriad abortions being performed, many occur only
after the deepest kind of soul-searching, in an agony of conscience
that ultimately cannot be second-guessed by an outsider to the
decision. But the staggering statistics on the number of abortions
being performed, with the figures on fetal deaths in many areas
outracing the figures on live births, compel the conclusion that
the increment in female autonomy assured by liberalized abortion laws is being purchased a t a horrendous price in terms of
innocent life. We are saddened by this spectacle not only because
of the terrible toll that is being paid in the coinage of tiny bodies,
but also because we are conscious of other legal systems in which
the tragic dilemma of women's rights and fetal life appears to
have been resolved with greater sensitivity. We are convinced
that even within the now well-entrenched confines established by
the Supreme Court's abortion decisions, responsible steps can be
taken to enhance this country's sensitivity and effectiveness in
protecting potential life without detracting from the degree of
autonomy that has now been guaranteed to women. Without
embracing Roe u. Wade and its progeny as an ideal solution to
the abortion dilemma, this Article has attempted to articulate
avenues of sensitivity that have been left open by the Supreme
Court-avenues that, if implemented, could effectuate not only
a net savings in fetal life, but also a significant expansion and
deepening of the genuine and rational exercise of female autonomy as well.

